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Abstract
Anxiety, hostility, guilt, and an exaggerated startle response are common symptoms
experienced by Vietnam veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the
present study, several theory based path models of posstcle causal relationships among
these symptomsand exposure to trauma (combat)were developedand assessed in two
samples of Vietnam veteranswith PTSD. A total of 39 Vietnam combat veterans with
PTSDand 34 Vietnamcombat veterans without PTSD took part in the study. All subjects
completedtheState-TraitAnxietyInventory(STAI), the Buss-DurkeeHostility Inventory,
and either the LegaciesCombat Scale-Revised or the Combat Exposure Scale (CES).
Audilorystartledata wasalso available for 15 of the veterans with PTSD and 10of the
veterans withoutPTSD. Assessment of an initialmodel indicated that intensity of combat
exposureper se is not predictive of PTSD symptomatology. Given that the latest edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual statesthat an individual's perception of an event
as traumatic is equally as importantas the objective severity of the trauma, tt:.. initial
model was modified to includea trauma factorthat represented those aspectsof combat
that accounted for the variability in PTSD diagnosis.The good overall fit indices and
significant paths obtainedwhen the modified model was applied to a test sample of
veterans replicated when the model was applied to a second data sample. Alternative
models of the relationshipsamong the relevant variables, with literature based rationale,
were constructed andassessedin the two datasamples.These alternativemodelsdiffered
from the initial model in terms of the relationships predicted between trauma, slate
anxiety, and trait anxiety. Of the four alternative models tested, two were found to fit
the two data samples as well as the hypothesized model. Overall, the results of the study
suggest that the increased levels of hostility seen in veterans with PTSD may be due to
increases in anxiety that result from exposure to trauma. Increases in hostility then lead
to increased guilt. In addition, the models tested supported the idea that the exaggerated
start le response observed in many individuals with PTSD is the result of elevated levels
of state anxiety. Implications of each of the models for therapy arc discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Pcsurau mat !e Stress Disorder: A IIistorica l Perspective
Descriptions of the symptomsof posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) appear as early
as the works of Homer and Cicero (fomb, 1994). However, it is only over the course
of the last one hundred years that these symptoms have been named and grouped in an
effort to understand the nature of the disorder that produces them.
Two important e....ents occurred in the last century that resulted in an explosion of
interest in posttraumat ic disorders (fri mble, 1985). The first of these was the American
Civil War. During the war doctors noted that many soldiers suffered from a state of
physical and mental exhaustion. Unable to account (or this they relied on the diagnosis
of "neurasthenia" (Trimble, 1981). The term "soldier's heart " also arose during this war,
because many soldiers complained of heart palpitations and chest pain (Ma rmar and
Horowitz, 1988).
At around the same time, travel by train in Europe increased. There was a
corresponding rise in the number of railway accidents. As a result, many lawsuits were
brought agains t the railway companies by individuals claiming chronic pain, anxiety, and
invalidism due 10 trauma from the accident (Trimb le, 1985). In 1882, John Eric
Erichsen, a London surgeon, provided one of the earliest explanations of PTSD. In his
book. Erichsen described symptoms "following (train) accidents which may assume the
form of traumatic hys teria, neurasthenia, hypochondriasis, or melancholia" (Keiser ,
1968). These symptoms were believed 10 be due to "molecular disarrangeme nt" or
vascular changes in the spinal cord (fitchener and Ross, 1974; . In 1885, Herbert Page,
introduced the term "nervous shock" as an alternative explanation of the symptoms see n
in people after railway accidents. Unable to find any evidence to support the idea thai
railway spine was the result of organic disease, Page postulated that the symptoms were
psychological (Trimble, 1985).
The idea that trauma-relatedsyndromes were due to an organic pathology re-emerged
during World War I. During this conflict lIlany soldiers displayed one or more of the
following symptoms: daze, fear, trembling, nightmares, and an inability 10 function
(Marmar and Horowitz, 1988), These symptoms were attributed to a condition known
as "shell-shock", which was believed to be the result of head injuries and vascular
damage caused by air blasts from high explosives (Mar mar and Horowitz, 1988).
However, several observations made near the end of World War I led to 11m
conclusion that the symptoms of "shell-shock" were not necessarily due to physical
trauma. They were: ( I) the symptoms of "shell-shock" were rare in individuals exposed
to explosives (Glass, 1954); (2) severe brain and spinal cord injuries were not
accompanied by symptoms similar to those in "shell-shock" (Glass, 1954); (3) the
symptoms of "shell-shock" occurred in individuals who had not been exposed to
explosive devices (Trimble, 1981); and (4) many patients believed 10be suffering from
"shell-shock" showed rapid improvement following brief psychological treat ment at
forward areas (Glass, 1954). Because of these observations the concept of "shell-shock"
soon fell by the wayside. In its place emerged the diagnostic category of
"psychoneuroses" which incorporated "war neuroses" and "traumatic neuroses" (Bourne ,
1978). This new terminology reflected the view that these d isorders, although brought
on by co mbat exposure, were the result of predisposin g character or personality defects
(Bourne , 1978). This idea was perpetuated by the military, who after dealing with the
high cost of mental diso rders due to combat in World War I, suggested that psychiatric
screening be carried out (Glass, 1966). Thus, the notion of a premorbid personality type
began to domina te the literature with the resultant d ismissal of the traumatic effects of
According to Glass (1966), it became evident earl y in World War II that psychiatric
screening was neith er effective nor practical . Despite a pre-induction psychiatric rejection
rate that was five to six times higher during World War II, the incidence of psychiatric
disorders was two to three times higher than that obse rved in World War [(Gl ass, 1966).
Apparently, a re -evaluation of combat-related stress symptoms was necessary. Grinke r
and Spiegel (1945) prov ided such an evaluation with the results of their study on combat
reactions. They reported nineteen common symptoms that persisted long after soldiers
were re moved from combat. In order of frequency these sy mptoms were restlessness,
irritability and agg ressive behavior, fatigue on aris ing and lethargy, difficulty in falling
asleep, subjective anxie ty, easy fatigue, startle reaction, feeling of tension, depression,
personality chan ges and memory disturbances, tre mor and evidence of sympathetic
overacuvit y, difficu lty in concentrating and mental confusion, increased alcoholism,
preoccupation with combat experiences, decreased appetite, nightmares and battle
dreams, psychosomatic symptoms,irrationalfears (phobias), and suspiciousness(Grinker
and Spiegel, 1945),
It was also during World War 11 that Kardiner provided the first systematic
definition of PTSD with his diagnosis of "physioneumsis", a term that emphasized the
co-existence of physiological and psychological symptoms (Tomb, 1994). The main
featuresof Kardlner's traumatic syndrome were (I) persistence of a startle response and
Irritability; (2)proclivity to explosiveoutbursts of aggression; (3) fixation on the trauma;
(4) constrictionof the general level ofpc rsonality functioning; and (5) atypical dream life
(Kardiner, 1959).
Seven years after the end of World War II, the original Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) was published. DSM·l's (1952) "Tra nsient Situational Personality
Disorders" includedthe categoryof "GrossStress Reaction" (GSR). GSR was described
as a transient reaction in a normal individual to "conditions of greator unusual stress",
It was to be distinguished from neuroticor psychotic conditions basedon its reversibility,
transient nature and the speed withwhichit cleared upon prompt andadequate treatment.
However, it was possible that the condition could progress to one of the neurotic
reactions. If the condition persisted, GSR was to be seen as a temporary diagnosis until
a more definitive diagnosis could be established. DSM-I (1952) also required the
specification of the nature of the stressor as either combat or civiliancatastrophe,
DSM~II (1968) minimized reactions to trauma by reclassifying GSR into the category
(DSM 307.3) "Adj ustment reaction of adult life", This category gave three examples of
the reaction: (I) unwanted pregnancy accompanied b y hostil ity, depression and suicidal
gestures ; (2) fear associat ed with militarycombat and manifested by trembling , running,
and hiding; and (3) a Ganse r syndrome as sociated w ith the death sentence.
It soon became appare nt that the descrip tionso f trauma reactions in DSM -JI (1968)
wcre inadequate. Awareness regarding the impact of trauma was on the increase for
several reasons: (I) the growing number of psychological casualties (rom the Vietnam
War; (2) the recogn ition o f a best of PTSD-li ke symptomsin victimsof civilian disasters
such as the Buffa lo Cree k dam collapse in 1972; and (3) the publication in 1978 of
Horowitz ' s Stress Response~, a text that examined the impact of trauma in
civilian populations (Tomb, 1994) .
DSM- III (19 80) was the fi rst diagnostic manual to include the diagnosis of
"Posttraumatic S tress Disorder". PTSD was included within the an xiety disorders and
described a consis tent pattern of symptoms that occurred following exposure to "a
stressor that would evoke significan t symptoms of di stress in almost anyone" (Criterion
A). To be diagnosed with PTSD , an individual ha d to exhibit at least four symptoms
(romthree symptom clusters that included formsof reexperie ncing the trauma (Criterion
B), numbing of responsiv eness or reduced involvem ent (Criterion C), and heightened
arousal and avoidance o f reminders of the trauma (Criterio n D), According 10 Wilson
(1994), the ere-nonof PTSDas a separate d iagnosti c category washistorically important
for seve ral reasons. It st imulated more research; pro moted clarification regarding the
natureo f comorbid disorders; and helpedc liniciansavoid misdiagnosis andmis treatment.
The recognition of PTSD as an official mental diso rder also led 10its usc in the courts
(Wilso n , 1994).
DSM- tII- R was publis hed in 1987 and included a revisio n of the diag nostic criter ia
for PTS D. This revision was the resu lt of knowledge gained from research and clinical
work wi th victims of traum a (Wilso n, 1994). DSM-I1I-R increased the total nu mber of
d iagnostic symp toms 10 17 with the requirement thai an individual must ex hibit six
sy mptoms from the three major clusters presen ted in DSM-III ( 1980). As well DS M-III-R
( 1987) requi red that the symptoms had been prese nt for at lea s t one mon th from the time
ofthc tra uma or had begun at least six months afte r the trauma (delayed onset). DSM-III-
R (1987) also attempted to clarify the diagnostic criteria. Wit h regards to Crhcrton ' A·,
stressors associated with the onset o f PTSD were now defined as "externa l events outside
the usual range of daily has sles tha t would be markedly distressi ng to almost everyone. "
DSM- II1-R (1987) also redefined Criteri on "8" by specifying thai the traumatic event be
pe rsiste ntly re-experienced and that the visual imagery and e motional distress a ssociated
wi th the trauma be intrusive, unbidden . involuntary , and unexpected . In addition, DSM~
III-R (1987) incl uded new ways in which the event cou ld be re-experienced and in which
peop le co uld avoid its imp act or numb or diminish painful emotions associa ted with
memories of it (Criterio n "C"). Finally, in response to advances in the psychob iology of
PTS D, DSM· III · R (1987) reorgan ized the "0 " d iagnostic category (Wilson , 1994).
Survivor guilt, memory impai rment, and hypera lertness were deleted a nd replaced with
irritability or outbursts o f anger , hypervigilance, and physiologic reactiv ity upon
exposure to stimuli thai activatedmemories of thetraumatic event.
Thus, at the end of !he1980's, PTSDwasdefined as a response that occurred when
an individual WiS e xposed to a severe stressor outside the range of usual human
experience. Th isresponsegenerated a number of consistent symplo{lls that wereclustered
into threecategories: (I ) inlrUsiveor re-experiencingsymptoms; (2 ) avoidanceresponses
to evidenceof !hetraumaor generalized psychological numbing andisolation; and (3)
widespreadpsycholog ical arousalnot previously present.
Posttraumat ic Stress Disorder: Curre nt Diagn osllc Crllerla
The fourth edition of thediagnostic andstatisticalmanualwas published in 1994 and
includessome revisions to the PTSiJdiagnostic criteria. Of particular importance is the
redefinition of thestres sor, crit erion-A-. ln DSM-IV (1994), emphasisis shifted from
the severity of thestre ssorto a mixture of exposure to a traumatic event combined with
the patient's reactionto it Tomb (1994 ) states that thisch ange re flects the predominant
idealhat lhe individual ' s perceptionof thetrauma is almo sras important in determining
the stressor's impactand the production of symptomsas is theobjective severity of the
stressor itself.
DSM-1V (1994) maintains thethree clusters of symptoms in the DSM·III-R (J987).
Inaddition, DSM-IV ( 1994)also requires that the duratio n of the disorder be specified.
If the symptoms havebeen present(or less thanthreemonths, the individual isclassified
as having acute PTSO. If symptoms have lasted threeor more months the disorder is
consideredchronic. Finally, if at least six mo,::hs have passed between the traumatic
event and the onset of symptoms the ind ividual is described as having PTSD with delayed
onset.
The Epidem iology of Posttr aumatic StressDisorder
Taking into consideratio n that prevale nce rates are affected by the methods used to
attain them as well as the population sampled, DSM-IV (1994) stales that lifetime
prevale nceofPTSD in the com munity ranges from 1% to 14%. At -risk individuals, such
as comba t veterans, victims o f natural disasters or crime, show prev alence rates ranging
from 3% to 58 %.
According to Tomb (1994), one reason for the difficulties in defining the
epidemiology of PTSD is that other psychopathologies can alter the form and incidence
of the disorder . It is well established that there is a high rate of psyc hiatric cornorbid ity
amo ng patients with PTSD (Blank, 1994; Davidson and Fairba nk, 1993; Keane and
Wolfe, 1990). Possible ccmorbid illnesses include generalized anx iety disord er (GAD),
dep ression, dysthymia, Obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic diso rder, substance abuse,
phob ias, and mania (Davidson and Fairbank, 1993). However , which disorders arc
primary and which are secondary is still unclear. Depressive, antisocia l, o r substance
abuse factors may place people at risk when exposed to an extreme stressor (Keane and
Wo lfe, 1990). Alternative ly depression, substance abuse, or ant isocial charac terist ics
could develop as a function of PTSD symptomatology, and the individual' s attempts to
cope with dist ress (Keane and Wolfe, 1990).
Cli nical Findings and YfSD
Recentresearch findings suggest that patients with PTSD have marked abnormalities
in: (I) sympatheticand/or autonomic nervous systemarousal; (2) hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis function and; (3) theendogenousopioidsystem. The present section will be
a brief reviewof thcrelevant psychophysiological andneuroendocrine findings in patients
with PTSD.
Currently, psychophysiological assessment provides the most specific biological
diagnostic test for PTSD (Friedman, 1991). It is also considered a major source of
support for thc validity of the diagnosis of PTSD(pitman, Orr , Forgue, Altman, dc
Jong, and Herz, 1990). Psychophysiologic investigations of PTSD have beencarried out
since World War I. Meakins andWilson (1918) exposed veterans with "shell-shock" to
gunfire and sulfuric flame and found that, in comparison to healthy subjects, they
exhibited greater increasesin heart rate and respiratory rate. Similar groups of subjects
also exhibited severe anxiety, heart rate, and blood pressure increases when given
intravenous epinephrine (Peabody, Clough, Sturgis, Wearn, and Tompkins, 1918).
Since the 1980's, a number of psychophysiologic studies have been conducted that
have further documented heightened autonomic or sympathetic nervous system arousal
in individuals withPTSD. Basedon the stimulus used to elicit physiological responses,
these studies fall into one of three experimental paradigms; (1) responses to external
stimuli reminiscent of thetrauma; (2) responses to mental imagery of the trauma;and (3)
responses to intensebut neutral stimulations, such asauditory startle stimuli(Shalev and
10
Rogel-Pucbs, 1993).
Seve ral studies have shown that combat veterans with PTSD exh ibit sig nificantly
larger increasesin heart ratewhen exposed10 visual andauditorycombat-relatedstimuli
compared with combat veterans without PTSD (Malloy, Fairbank. and Keane, 1983) .
combat veterans with psychiatric di sorders other than PTSD (Palhney er, Blan chard, and
x otb, 1986) or healthy controls (Blanchard, Kolb, Pallmeyer, and Gerardi, 1982).
Blanchard, Kolb , Prins , Gates , and McCo y (1991) compar ed hea rt rate and blood
pressure response; 10 combat sounds in Vietnam veterans with PTSD and combat
controls. The difference in these responses correctly classified 80% of the subjects into
those with or without PTSD. The discriminant function derived fro m this group of
subjects was then applied to a second gro up of veterans and yielded 83 % correc t
discrimination.
Studi es of responses to mental imagery differ from those that look at response 1.0
standard stimuli in that they use subjects' own recollection of the trauma as the eliciting
stimulus. Thus, these studies look at physio logical response to reminiscences (Shalev and
Rogel-Fu chs, 1993).
In one such study, Pitman, Orr, Forgue, de long , and Cla iborn (1987) asked
Vietnam veterans with PTSD and combat co ntrols to listen to recorded scripts describing
traumatic events. Some of the scripts were standardized while others were ba sed on the
subjects ' own individual experie nces. Imagery of the subjects' personal incidents
provoked extreme heart rate, electromyogram , and skin cond uctance response s in PTSD
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subjects, bUI not in combat controls. A discriminant functionanalysis, based on the size
of these responses, distinguished PTS D veterans from non·PTS D vete rans with a
specificityof 100%and a sensitivity of 61%.
In a second study Pitman e t al. ( 1990) compared the physiological responses of
Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD and Vietnam combat veterans with non-PTSD
anxiety disorders to tapes of individual combatscripts. Subjects wi th PTSD exhibited
higher skinconductance andelectromyogram responses to the individ ualized scriptswhen
comparedto the anxious subjects. Thed iscriminant functionderived fromPitmanet aI. 's
(1987) study wasapplied tothe physiolog icalresponsesof thesesubjects. It distinguished
PTSD subjects from non·P'TSD anxious subjects with a sensitivity of 71% and a
specificity of 100%.
Orr andPitman(1993)have alsoused personalizedcombatexperience scripts to look
at the abilityof non-PI'Slj veterans to simulatethe physiologic responsesof PTSD, They
found that skin conductance an d electromyogram responses best discriminated PTSD
veterans from non·PTSD veterans and that most non-PTSDveterans were unable to
simulate the physiologic response patterns of the PTSDveterans.
One of the diagnostic criteria of PTSD isan exaggeratedstartle response (DSM-IV,
1994). Likethe symptom of physiological arousal, it is uniquein the diagnosis of PTSD
in that it can be confirmedwithout using self-report measures(Butler, Braff, Rausch,
Jenkins, Sprock, and Geyer, 1990). In addition, studies using the aco ustic startle
respo nseparadigm use elementary stimuli thai are notassociatedwith thetraumaticevent
12
and do nor require deliberate mental activity by the subject (Shalev and gcget -Pochs.
1993). Despite its apparent value as a diagnostic tool. 10dale ooly a few studies have
been conducted that look at the val idity of the startle response in PTSD .
Butler et al , (1990) tested Vietnam veterans with PTSD and non-PTSO veterans for
acoustic and tactile startle response using eyeblink electromyogram amplitudes as their
depen dent variable. vet erans with PTSD exhibited higher cycblink electrom yogram
amplitudes than non·PTSD veterans. No significant differences were found between the
two groups in tact ile startle response magnitude. Th is may be due to sti mulus specific,
in Ihis case auditory or tactile, startle reactions in individuals with combat-related PTSD
(Butler et al., 1990).
Paige , Reid, Allen, and Newton (1990) measuredevent-relatedcomponent amplitudes
and heart rate to four intensities of randomly presented tones in Vietnam veterans with
PTSD and com bat veterans witho ut P'TSD. Measu ring event related brain potcnth..1s
(ERPs) provides a means of examining central nervous system responses thai are
sensitive to the processi ng of sensory inp ut (P;t.ige er al., 1990). Ind ividuals can be
class ified as augmenters o r reducers based on their ERP compon ent amplitudes as a
function of stimulu s intensity (Paige et al. • 1990). Augmenting is assoc iated with a cortex
tu ned to seek increases in stimulus intensity. Reducing is associa ted wit h IIprotectiv ely
tuned sensory system that attempts to shut ou t increased stimulation. Paige et al . (1990)
hypoth e sized that individuals with PTSD , when faced with intense stimu li, ente r a slate
o f protective inhibition and thus would have ERP gradients tha t correspond ( 0 those or
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reduce rs. The results of the study sugges ted that the veterans with PTSD were more
autonomicallyarousable than the control subjectsand that theywere more likely to be
ERP reducers.
Shalev, Orr, Peri, Schreiber, and Pitman (1992) looked at heartrate, electromyogram
responses and skin conductance responses in noncombatPTSD patients, anxiety disorder
patients, mentally healthy patients with traumatic experiences, and mentally healthy
subjectswithout traumatic experiences.They found thai P'TSD patients had larger heart
rate and skin conductance responses and also did not show habituation of the skin
conductance component of the acoustic startle response.
Orr, Lasko, Shalcv, and Pitman (1995) compared the startle responses of Vietnam
combat veterans with and without PTSD. They found that the veterans with PTSD
exhibited larger heart rate and eyeblink responses and that skin conductance response
magnitude declined more slowly across trials in veterans with PTSD compared to non-
PTSD controls. However, the number of trials it took for PTSD veterans and non-PTSD
veterans to reach the skin conductance nonresponse criterion did not differ. Thus,
veteranswith PTSD were able to habituate the skin conductancecomponent of the startle
response but at a slower rate than the nonPTSD subjects.
Given the sympathetic psychophysiological hyper-reactivity of individuals with
M'SD , one would predict an associated elevation in catecholamine levels (Friedman,
199 1). Kosten, Mason, Giller, Ostroff, and Harkness (1987) have found elevated urinary
epinephrine and norepinephrine levels in hospitalized patients with PTSD in comparison
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to inpatients with diagnoses of major depressive disorder, bipolar mania. paranoid
schizophrenia, and undifferentiated schizophrenia.Ychuda, Southwick. Giller. Xinowan,
and Mason (1992) also report elevatedurinaryepinephrine, norepinephrine and dopamine
levels in inpatient and outpatient Vietnamcombat veterans with PTSD in comparison10
inpatient and outpatient normal control subjects. In contrast to the findings of these two
studies, Pitman and Orr (1990) report no differencein urine levels of norepinephrineand
epinephrine in combat veterans with PTSD whencompared to healthy nonpsychiatric
combat veteran control subjects.
Yehuda, Giller, Southwick, Low}', and Mason, (1991) suggest that methodological
differences in urine samplingand the use of combat veterans for controls may account
for the inconsistencies in these studies. However, the differencein these findings indicate
that attention should bepaid to the nature of the control groupbeing used for comparison
when interpreting the results ofneu rocndocrine studies of PTSD. Yehuda et al. (1991)
suggest that studies looking at individuals with PTSD should include combat controls
and normal controls.
Consistent with the observation of increased peripheral catecholamine levels in
individuals with PTSD, Perry, Giller, and Southwick (1987) report a 40% reduction in
in vitro total alpha2-adrenergic receptor binding sites in the platelets ofi npatient Vietnam
veterans with PTSD compared to normal control subjectswithout PTSD. Since the late
1970' s, the platelet alpbaz-adrencrgtc receptor has been used as a marker for the central
alpha2-receptor (Perry, Southwick, Yehuda, and Giller, 1990). PTSD subjects also
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exhib it an increased low to high affinity binding sue ratio in comparison to controls
(Perry et al., 1981) . These findings suggest that the platelet alphaz -adrcner gic receptor
sites in PTS D patients show both down-regulation and desensitization (P erry et el.
1990) . Th is alteration of alphaz -adrenerglc receptor sites is further suppo rted by the
finding of decreased lymphocyte adcnylatc cyclase activity in inpatients with PTSD as
a result of combat, terrorist activityand automobile accidentscompared to age and sex
matched non psych iatric controls (Lerer, Ebstein , Shestasky, Shcmesh, and Greenbe rg,
1987). In addition, the alpha2-agonist clonidine has been shown to reduce anxiety and
autonomic arousal in Cambodian refugees with PTSD (Kinzie, 1989).
Biochemi cal challenge studies have show n that agents such as lactate (Rainey,
Alce m, Ort iz, Yeragani, Pohl, and Berchou, 19 87) and yohimbine (Southwick, Krystal,
Mor gan , Joh nson, Nagy, Nicolaou, Heninger , and Charn ey, 1993) elicit pan ic attacks
and Vietnam- related flashbacks in veterans with PTSD. The anxiogenic properties of
yoh imbine are mediated through its 'ability 10 increase presynaptic activi ty by
antag onizing the alpha2-adren ergic autoreceptor (Southwick, Bremner, Krys tal , and
Charn ey, 1994). The observed effects of yohimbi ne are consistent with the increased
periph eral catecholamine excretion and down-r egulation of platelet alpha2 -adrenergic
receptors observed by Perry et at. (19B7}. Precisely how lactate has its effects is
unknown although central noradrenergic dysregulatton has been suggested (Southwick et
al., 199 4).
It thus appears that elevated catecholami ne levels may be biochemical marker s for
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the sympathetic dysregulation associated with PTSD. However I they may also reffect
another abnormal ity, reduced monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity in individ uals with
PTSD (Fried man, 1991). Since MAO is a major degradalive enzyme in catecholamine
metabolism. reduced MAO could lead to higher systemic NE and EP I levels.
Davidson , Lipper, Kilts, Mahomey, and Hammett (1985) have reported lower
platelet MAO activ ity in veterans with PTSD compared to age-matched normal control
subjec ts, However , it should be noted that when the PTSD group in this stud) was
divided into indiv iduals with and without a history of alcoho l abuse , only the former
differed significantly from the control subjects (Davidson et lilt , 1985).
The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal(HPA) axis has also been invcstigated in PTSD
because of the important role it plays in the stress response (Sutherland and Davidson ,
1994). As the primary function of HPA axis activation is to rapidly produce
glucocort icoids from the adrenals (Yehuda, Boisoneau, MilSC'n. and Giller, 1993), a
number of studies have looked at cortisol levels in individuals with P'TSD . Mason,
Giller, Kosten, Ostroff, and Podd (1986) report significantly lower mean 24 hour urinary
corti sol excretion in inpatients with PTSD when compared to inpatient control subjects
with diagnoses of major depressive disorder , bipolar mania, parano id schizophrenia, and
undiffe rentiated schizophrenia. Yehuda, Teicher, Levengood , Tre stman, and Siever
(1994) also report lower mean 24 hour urinary cortiso l excre tion in patients with PTSD
in compariso n 10 patients with major depressio n and normal nonpsychiatric controls .
However , Pitman and Orr (1990) report finding increased 24 hour urinary cortiso l
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excretion in PTSD outpatients in comparison 10combat veteran control subjects. Once
again these differencescould beaccounted for by the method of urine sampling and the
usc of combat veterans as controls instead of normal volunteers(Yehuda el aI., 1991).
Alternatively, Yehuda et at (1990) suggest that these results may indicate thai the
HPA axis is dynamic in PTSD and that cortisol excretion is rela ted to the stale
characteristic o f severity o f the illness (Yehuda et aI. , 1990) . According to Yehuda,
Resnick, Kahana and Giller (1993), whether cortisol excretion for a PTSD patient is
higher or lower depends on the nature of the environmental srressors and part icular
symptoms being experienced at the limeof sampling.
Severalother findings support the idea of a dynamic HPA axisin PTSD. II has been
reported that combat veterans with PTSD have an increased number of lymphocyte
glucocort icoid recepto rs in comparison 10 normal control subjects (Yehuda, Lowy,
Southwick , Shaffer, &: Giller, 1991) and peuenu with major depressive disorder, bipolar
mania, panic disorder, and schizophrenia ( Ydlu da er at., 1993). In addition a strong
positive correlation has been found between lymphoc yte glucocorticoid receptor number
and PTSD symptoms (Ydl uda et aI. , 1991). According 10 Yehuda et aI. (1993), if a large
number of lymphocyte glucocorticoid receptors reflects a large number of neuronal
glucocortico id receptors, then it is possib le thai large numbers of glucoco rticoid
receptors in PTSD may help to modulate trans ient increases in cortisol and allo w for a
quicker recovery from stress in individuals with PTSD.
In addition, it has been shown that individual s wilh PTSD show an enhanced
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suppression of cortisol following administration of the steroid dexamethasone in
comparison 10 normalage-comparable controls(Yehuda, Southwick, Krystal, Bremner,
Charney, and Mason, 1993). This finding combined with those discussed above suggest
the existence of an enhanced negative feedback sensitivity of the HPA axis in PTSD
(Yehuda et aI., 1993) .
As stress-induced analgesia has been observed in animals after exposure to a variety
of inescapable stressors (van der Kolk and Fisler, 1993) researchers have also
investigated the endogenous opioid system in PTSD.
Pitman et al. (1990) , exposed a group of Vietnam veterans with PTS D and a group
of Vietnam veterans without PTSD to combat scenes from the movie f!..a1QQn. Subjects
in each group received either the narcot ic antagonist naloxone or a placebo . In the
placebo condition, subjects with PTSD showed a 30% decrease in reported pain intensity
ratings after the combat video. Subjects with PTSD in the naloxone condition and non-
PTSD subjects in eithe r condition exhibited no decrease in pain ratings. Out of a series
of hormonal, autonomic and emotional variables measured in the study , pain intensity
rating best differenti ated the PTSD and non·PTSD subjects . Pitman ct at. (1990) suggest
that dysregulation of the endogenous opioid system may cont ribute to the avoidance and
numbing symptoms of PTSD .
Models of PTSD
Yehuda and Antelman (1993) state that animal mode ls of human disorders are
valuable for several reasons. First , they allow the opportu nity to simula te a human
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co ndition in a controlled setting, with a large sample size, and in a simpler and more
eas ily understood system. Second, animal models , unlike human disorders which can
only be studiedwhen they becomeclinically noticeable, can beobservedas theydevelop.
This allows thestudy of symptoms as they develop. Finally, pharmacological and other
treatments that might be difficultto lest in humanscan be evaluatedin animals. Because
PTS D is a disorder in which the main precipita ting causes are known, Yehuda and
Antelman (1993) suggest that the potential exists 10 accurately model the disorder in
animals. Identification of whichvariablesproduce whichsymptomsin animals may serve
10 generate hypotheses about thedevelopment of PTSDin humans (Faa et al. , 1992). To
date, several animal models of PTSD have been developed. The followi ng section is a
b rie f review.
The Class ical Co nd itio ning Modet of PTSD
Classical condit ioning has been suggested as a mechanism that links the symp toms
of PTSD to the original trauma (Kolb and Multipassi , 1982). According to Southwick et
al. (1994), the feelings of fear and extreme anxiety an individual experiences when
exposed to a life- threatening trauma can become conditioned to a number of stimuli
present at the time of the trauma. Subsequently, these previously neutral stimuli are able
to evoke fear and anxie ty in the individual, a phenomenon thai Kolb (1987) refers to as
"co nditioned emotional response". Both specific and nonspecific cues associated with the
trau ma can become conditioned stimuli (Southwick et al., 1994). Stimulus generalization
an d higher order conditioning can also occur with the result that the individual
20
experiences fear and anxiety in response 10 a wide variety of stimuli (Southwick et al.,
1994). The role of conditioning in PTSD is supported by the psychophysiological
findingsdiscussed above whichsuggestthat individuals with PTSDexperience increased
aro usal to trauma-related cues in comparison to individuals without PTSD. As well ,
Pitman et al. 's (1990) finding of stress-inducedanalgesiain Vietnamveteranswith PTSD
exposed to trauma-related cues is accommodatedwithina conditioning model.
However, it has been argued that the conditioning model of PTSD docs not readily
account for the finding of an exaggerated startle response in manypatients wilh PTSD
(Krystal , 1990;Pitman , Orr, and Shalev, 1993; Shalev, 1993),
Th e Fea r-Putent late d Startle Model of PTSD
The basic startle response is viewedas an unconditioned form of phasic reactivity
(Orr et al., 1995). Based on the findings of their lesioning experiments, Davis,
Gendclman, Tischler and Gendelman (19B2) initially proposeda neural circuit (or the
acousticstartle response in the rat that consistedof the auditory nerve, the posterovcntral
cochlear nucleus, an area just medial to the ventral nucleus of the lateral lemniscus, a
ventromedialregion of the nucleus reticularispontiscaudalis, andspinal malar neurons.
However, Lee, Lopez, Meloni, and Davis(1996)have recently suggested thal thc large
lesion sizes and the relatively nonselective nature of the electrolytic lesions employedin
the Davis et al. (1982) study did not allowthe researchers (0 delineatethestartle pathway
in detail. Using fiber-sparing lesions, lee et al. (1996), have recently proposeda more
simplified acoustic startle pathwaythat consistsof three synapses.In this circuit, cochlear
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root neuronsembedded in the auditory nerve synapse onto neurons in the ventrolateral
part of the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalls which then synapse on spinal motor
Several authors havesuggested thatthe animalmodel of fear-potentiatedstartle may
be particularly useful for studying exaggerated startle in PTSD (Kolb, 1987; Krystal,
1990: Orr et al., 1995: Southwicket aI., 1994). However, it should be noted that it is
currently unclear whether the exaggerated startle seen in PTSD is associated with
increasedbaselinestartle, fear-potentiatedstartle, or both (Krystal, 1990).
Brown, Kalish, and Farber (1951) were the first to demonstrate that the amplitude
of the rodent acoustic startle response can be increased by presenting the auditory
stimulus in the presence of a cue, such as a light, that has previouslybeen paired with
a shock. The findings that startle potentiation is blocked by anxiolyticdrugs, enhanced
by anxiogenicdrugs, and fails tooccurin a nonassociativecontrol conditionsuggests that
fear-potentiatedstartle is producedby the associativeconditioningof a central fear state
(Cook, Hawk, Davis, and Stevenson,1991).
Fear alters startle at a specificpoint on its neural pathway(Davis, 1992). Berg and
Davis (1985) have shown that startle elicited from either the ventral cochlearnucleusor
the ventral lateral lemniscus is potentiatedby a conditionedfear stimulus.Startle elicited
in the nucleus reticularis /Y'.:"1tis caudalisor points beyond is not potentiated(Berg and
Davis, 1985).
Because the central nucleus of the amygdala has been shown to have direct
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projections 10 brain areas that may be involved in many of the symptoms of fear and
anxiety (Davis, 1992) researchers have looked .11 the role of the amygdala in fear-
potentiated startle. Low-level electrical stimulation of the amygdala has been shown to
increase the amplitude of the startle response (Davis. 1992). In addition. electrolytic or
ibotenic acid lesions of the central nucleus of the amygdala followi ng fear condition ing
co mpletely eliminate fear-potentiated startle to both auditory and visual conditioned
stimuli (Campeau and Davis, 1995). Campeau and Davis (1995) state thatthis finding
is consistent with the idea that the central nucleus of the amygdala functions as a
responseindependent, final common relay for fearconditioning. Campeau and Davis
(1995) also report that electrolytic or NMDA·induccd lesions of the basolatcral complex
of the amygdala disrupt fear-potentiated startle to conditioned stimuli of both modalities.
This finding is in keepi ng with the notion that, in fea r conditioning, the basolarcrat
complex of the amygdala serves as a necessary relay of sensory information from
subcortical and cortical sensory areas to the central nucleus of the amygdala (Ca mpeau
and Davis, 1995).
It also appears that the central gray may be a component of the neural ci rcuitry
involved in the fear enhancement of startle. Fendt, Koch, and Schnitzler (1994) have
found a projection in the rat brain from the central nucleus of thc amygdala to thc
central gray. In addition Fendt et al. (1994) have identified a projection fro m the
dorsomedial and lateral part of the central gray to the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis,
shown by Davis et al. (1982) to be an important component of the basic star tle response.
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Fendt et al, (1994) report that, in rats, lesions of the dorsal and lateral parts of the
centra l gray totall) ll ck sensitization of the acoustic startle response without affecting
the amplitude of the response in the absence of the sensitizing stimuli. In their study
Fendt et aJ. (1994) used footshock as the sensitizing stimulus. Pootshocks, like
conditioned fear, have been shown to increase the amplitude of the acoustic startle
response in rats (Davis, 1989).These findings are also consistent with Deakin and
Gracffts (1991) dual theory of anxiety involving the amygdala and the dorsal central
gray. According to Deakin and Graeff (1991), the amygdala is responsible (or
conditioned fear and anticipatory anxietywhile the dorsal central gray organizes the
response to aversive unconditioned stimuli. In humans, Deakin and Graeff suggest,
dysfunctional activation of the amygdala results in generalized anxiety while
dysfunctional activation of the dorsalcentralgrayleads to panic.
Researchers have looked at the startle response in healthy non-psychiatric human
subjects, Vrana,Spence,and Lang(1988)have foundthat the acousticstartle response
is enhanced when subjects view slides depicting unpleasant scenes and objects. This
effect is independentof measures of orienting, arousal, and interestin the subjectmatter
of the slides.Cooket al. (1991)haveexamined thegeneralizability ofstartJepotentiation
across a numberof emotionalstatesaswellas its sensitivityto individualdifferencesin
fearfulness. High and low fear subjectsweredistinguished on the basis of their scores
on the revisedversionof the FearSurveySchedule. Cooket et. (1991)report thatstartle
responseswerelarger inall aversivenegative statesthanduringpleasantimageryand that
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this effect was enhanced among high fear subject. The results of these two studies
suggest that potentiatedstartle in humansis associated with experimentally manipulated
fear and negativeaffect as it is in animals.
Grillon, Ameli, Foot, and Davis (1993) have examined the effects of individual
differences in state and trait anxiety, as measuredby the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger, 1983), on baselineand fear-potentiated startle. State anxiety was induced
by the threat of electric shock. The results showed thai magnitude of fear-potentiated
startle was larger in the high-anxiety group as compared to the low-anxiety group.
Baseline startle did not differ between the low and high anxiety subjects. Trait anxiety
did not relate to individualdifferences in either baseline or fear-potentiated startle, This
is consistent with the finding that the anxiogenicalpnaz-reccptor antagonist, yohimbine
increases the magnitude of the acoustic startle response in young healthy men (Morgan,
Southwick, Grillon, Davis, Krystal,and Charney, 1993) andcombat veterans with PTSD
(Morgan, Grillon, Southwick, Nagy, Davis, Krystal, and Charney, 1995). In the latter
study, yohimbine significantly increased the amplitude and magnitude of the startle
response in the veterans with PTSD but not in combat veteran control subjects without
PTSD. Because the startle responsesof the PTSDsubjects more closely resembled those
of the younger healthy control subjects used in the Morganet al, (1993) study, Morgan
et aI. (1995) suggestthat the lack of a significant yohimbine effect on the startle response
of the combat controls may be the resultof a reduction in the modulatory mechanisms
of the startle reflex causedby aging.
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Recently, Morgan, Grillon, Southwick, Davis and Charney (1995) examined the
effectsof threatof shockon startle responsesin Vietnamcombat veteranswith PTSDand
age-matched, healthy controls. Fear of shock was assessed with the stale portion of the
Slate Trait AnxietyInventory. State anxiety scores were higher at baseline and at the
time of shock anticipation in subjects with PTSD . While subjects with PTSD exhibited
significantly larger startle responses during baseline and during shock anticipation, the
rate of habituation of startle response did not differ betweenPTSD subjectsand controls.
Morgan et at. (1995)state that their findingssuggest thai the higher levels of startle seen
in PTSD patientsmaybe dueto their exnibitinga greater conditioned emotionalreponse
10threatening stimuli.
Orr et al. (1995)suggestthat if the exaggeratedstartle response seen in PTSD is the
result of anxiety or fear then reducing the anxiety associated with PTSD through
psychotherapyor medication shoulddecreasethe magnitudeof the startle response in lhis
disorder. It is worth noting that substancescommonly abusedby individualswith PTSO
includeanxiotytic substances such as the benzodiazeplnes, ethanoland the barbiturates,
all of which reduce fear-enhanced startle-response amplitude in experimental animals
(Howard and Ford, 1992). This also suggests that some individualswith PTSD exhibit
potentiatedstartle reponsesas a result of their being in withdrawalat the time of testing.
In their studyof Vietnamveteran twins True, Rice, Eisen, Heath, Goldberg, Lyons,
and Nowak(1993)found that 32% of the variancein self-reported startlewas accounted
for by genetics. Thus, the issue of predisposition also has relevancefor the startle issue
2.
in PTSD. Orr et aJ. (1995) suggest that the constitutional versus acqui red origin of
abnormal responsivity 10loud tones in PTSD could be looked at in a study that acquired
data from subjects prior to their experiencing a traumatic event.
The Inescapable Shock Model or PTSD
Van der Kolk, Greenberg, Boyd, and Krystal (1985) propose that the animal model
of inescapable shock (IS) may be directly applicable to PTSD. IS occu rs when anima ls
are subjected to stressful events, like electric shocks. frem which they arc unable to
escape. Animals who have experienced IS later exhibit (I) decreased initiation of
behavior, (b) cognitive deficits and (e) symptoms of emotional disruption (Rosen and
Fields, 1988).
Accord ing to van der Kolk et al. (1985) IS is a valid mode l of PTSD because the
behavioral and biochemicalchanges that occur with IS parallel the devctopmcnt of PTSD.
They provide several lines of evidence to support their theory. First . exposure to IS
increases NE turnover, increases plasma catecholamine levels, depletes central NE and
increases MHPG production (van der Kolk et al., 1985). That these neurotransmitter
systems are involved in the behavioral effects of exposure to IS is supported by the
finding that drugs that deplete brain eatecholamines produce similar alterations in
behavior (Krystal, 1990). Van der Kolk et al. (1985) state that the catecholamine-
mediated behavioral alterations seen with IS in animals parallel the negative symptoms
of P'fSD in humans. They state that the symptomsof global constriction, social isolation,
diminished motivation, and decline in occupational function are correlates of NE
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depletion. Van dec Kclk et al, (1985)also suggest that the positivesymptoms of PTSD
(exaggerated startle response, explosive outbursts, nightmares. and intrusive
recollections) arc the result of chronic adrenergic hypersensitivity followi ng transient
catecholamine depictionfrom acute trau-na. Petty, Chac, Kramer. Jordan, and Wilson
(I99 4) have recently shownthat ratswho havedeveloped learned helplessness as a result
of being exposedto inescapable tail shock showa significantly greater increasein NE
output after exposure to a milder form of IS in comparison to nonhelpless,
nonprestresscd, or control animals. Petty et al. (1994) conclude that IS sensitizes the
hippocampus to increase NE in response to a smaller, subsequent stressor.
Stress-inducedanalgesia (SIA) is another phenomenon that has been observedin IS
experimentsthat may be relevantto PTSD in humans (van der Kolk et aI., 1985), SIA
refers to the finding that animals exposed to inescapable shock developanalgesiawhen
rc-exposedto a subsequent stressor within a brief period of time(van der Kolk, 1987).
SIA is mediated by endogenous oplcids and is reversed by naloxone(Kelly, 1982).
Naloxone and termination of the stressful stimuli can produce opiate withdrawal
symptomssuggesting that chronic stresscan producea physiological statesimilar to thai
of opiate dependency(van dcr Kolk, 1987).
It hasbeen established that a reciprocal relationship exists between the opioid and
noradr encrgic systems (van der Kolk et at , 1985), II has also been suggestedthai the
locus cocrulcus mediates opiate withdrawal symptoms through noradrenergic
hyperactivity (van der Kolk et al., 1985). Symptoms of opiate withdrawal include
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anxiety, irritability, explosive outbursts, insomnia, hyperajertncss, and emotionallability
(van der Kolk et al. , 1985). Given that these symptoms resemble the positive symptoms
of PTSD. van der Kolk et aI. (1985) postulate thai opiate wilMrawaland PTSD may
have a common cause in that they are both due, in part, 10 central noradrenergic
hyperactivity. Thus, exposure to a traumatic situation maygive rise to an endorphin
response that subjectively provides a paradoxical senseof control (van der Kolk cr al.,
1985). Accord ing to van der Kolk et al. (1985) subsequent withdrawal of the traumatic
stimulus leads \0 the physiological symptoms of opiate withdrawal (anxiety.
hyperactivity. and explosive outbursts of aggressiveness).
Pitman et aL's (1990) finding that Vietnam veterans with PTSD exhibit SlA in
response to trauma-related stimuli supports the SIAcomponentof van dcr Kolk ct al. 's
(1985) model. The clinical observation that individuals exposed 10 traumatic c....ents
appear to experiencea lifelong preoccupation with repetition of the trauma alsosupports
this model (van der Kolk et aI., 1985).
The IS model of PTSD has howeverbccn cri ticizedfor several reasons. It has been
argued that the modelfails10adequatelyexplain the chronicity and delayed development
of some of the symptoms of PTSD (Yehuda and Anle1man, 1993; Jones and Barlow,
1990) . Inaddition, Yehuda and Anlelman (1993)starethat the IS model docs notaccount
for the possibility of developing the symptomsof PTSD after a single, brief exposure 10
trauma. Finally, because thebiochemical and behavioral alterations can only beproduced
in animals tha t are unable to escape the shock the model fails to take into consideration
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the effect of stressor intensity, a factor that has been shown to be relevant to the severity
of PTSD (Yehuda and Antleman , 1993).
Despite its shortcomings, Yehudaand Antleman (1993) suggest that the IS model o f
PTSD maybe a valuable means10 further the understanding of the factors that make an
individual susce ptible to PTSO. IS is able to accou nt for the interindividual variabili ty
in response 10 a stressor in that it has been shown 10produce behavioral differences in
only a portion of exposed animals (Krysta l, 1990). Studies in which animals have bee n
bred for susceptibility 10 IS suggest thai inherited biological traits may also influenc e
vulne rability to PTSD (Krystal, 1990). In their Vietnam ve teran twin study , True et al.
(1993) reported that ge netic analysis indicated inheritance had a substantial influence on
liability for all symptoms , even after adjusting for combat experience.
The Kindling Model or PTSD
As a result of his work with IS, van der Kolk (n81) also suggests that kindling is
an animal model that may be applicable to PTSD. Kindling refers to a process by which
repea ted presen tation of subthreshold stimuli, such as electrical or chemical stimulation ,
sensitizes limbic circui ts and leads to lowered firing thresholds (Martin, 1991 ) .
Accord ing to the kindling model of PT SD, repeated traumatization or intrusive re-
experiencing of a single trauma results in chronic central sympathetic arousal that is
mediated by the locus coe ruleus (van der Kolk, 1987). Th is chronic arousal then kindles
pathways from the loc us coeruleus to other limbic structures such as the hippocampus
and the amygdala (van de r Kolk, 1987). As was mentioned previously, it has been shown
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in rats that sensitization of lhehippocampus results in an increaseof NE in response 10
subsequent, smaller stimulation (PtIlY et al., 1994), Nieminen, Sirvic , T eittieen,
Pitkanen, Airaksinen, and Rielddnen(1992) haveshown thai kindling of the basotatcrat
amygdala in rats increases anxiety in lhe elevated plus maze but docs not affect spatial
memory as evidenced by similar performance to that of control animals in the Morris
water maze, Adamec (1990) and Adamec and McKay (1993) rcpor11hat anxiety in the
elevated plus maze is also increased in rats by kindling of the right medial amygdala. In
a subsequent study Adamec and Morgan (1994)comparedthe effectsof kindling in the
medial and basola teralamygdaloid nuclei in each hemisphere . They found that kindling
of the medial or basclate ral amygdala in the left hemisphere decrea sed anxiety in the
elevated plus maze forat least a week after thelast kindled seizure. In contrast 10 this,
kindling of the right hemispheric medial or basolateral amygdala tended 10 increase
anxiety. Theresults of Adamec and Morgan ', (1994) study a re of particular interest in
light of the soon 10be published finding that individuals with PTSD show increased
bleed flow, as measured by positron emission tomography, in right-sided limbic and
paralimbic areas whenexposed to audiotapes of individualized traumatic event scripts
(Rauch, van der Kolk, Fisler, Alpert, Orr, Savage, Fischman, Jenike, and Pitman, in
press). Th is finding is consistent with the theory thai the right hemisphere is involved in
negative emotions (Sackeim, Greenberg, Weiman, Gur, Hungcrbuhler, and Gcschwind,
1982).
Thus , it appears that a kindling-like phenomenon may account for the gene ralized
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anxiety experienced by many individuals with PTSD. Davis (1992)has also stated that
electrical stimulation of the ratamygdalaproducesbehavioral and autonomiceffects that
include changesin heartrate, bloodpressure, respiration, and elevatedstartle. If kindling
reduces thefiringthreshold for neurons in theamygdala or relevant structures connected
to it, this could account for the increased arousability upon provocation observed in
individuals with PTSD compared to individuals without PTSD .
Of additional relevance to the kindling model of PTSD, is the finding that anxiety
and fear are more commonin patientswith epilepsy than normals (Mittan and Locke,
1982). Adamec (1990) has proposed that repealed and intense involvement of limbic
tissueduring epileptic seizuresincreasesa patient' s vulnerability to anxiety in response
to the psychological and environmental stress created by their disorder. The
demonstration that the anti-convulsant carbamazepine provides some benefit to PTSD
sufferers also supports the kindling model of PTSD (Lipper, Davidson, Grady, and
Edinger, 1986).
The Time- Dependent Sensitization Model or PTSD
A model related to kindlingand IS is lhat of time-dependent sensitization(Antelman,
1988; Rosen and Fields, 1988; Yehuda and Antelman, 1993). Sensitizationrefers to the
ability o f a potentially threatening stimulus to enhance the response to the same or a
weaker stimulus presented at a later time (Antelman, 1988). In the animal modelofUme-
dependent sensitization, the animal receives one brief exposure to a stressor and is later
tested with the same or another recall stressor (Yehuda and Antelman, 1993). In
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comparison 10 animals receiving the stressor for the first time, animals previously
exposed exhibit significantly altered responsivity (Yc huda and Antelman, 1993).
Antelman (1988) has shown that this effect increases with lime since the first expos ure.
According to Yehuda and Antelman (1993) this indicates that the influe nce of the first
stressor strengthens solely as a function of the passage of lime.
Intermittencyis a keyelement of sensitization in that sensitization is morelikel y 10
occ ur follo wing pe riodic rat her Ihan frequent exposure to an appro priate stimulus
(Antelman , 198B). According to Antclman (1988) the combination o f a potentially
threatening stimulus and Intermittency as the determinants of sensi tization is
accommodatedwithin anevolutionaryadaptationperspective,in thaidangeroussituations
are more likely to be encountered on a moreperiodic basis than innocuous events. Thus,
sensitization can be viewedas an unusualform of memorywhich enables an organism
to makean accelerated defenseresponse to a previously experienced threat (Antclman,
1988).
Yehuda and Antetman (1993) state thai time-dependent sensitization meets all the
requirements of what they believeconstitutes an appropriatea nimal model of PTSD.
First, it can occur as a result ofa very brief exposure to a stressfulevent, as is the case
with some casesof PTSD.Second, it can be inducedby a variety ct strcssorsof varying
intensity which replicates Yehuda et a1.'s (1992) finding of a relationship between
stressor intensityand severity of PTSD symptoms. Third , theeffectsof time-dependent
sensitizationbothpersist for long periods of time and increase with the passage of time
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which is similar to what is seen with chron ic or delayed PTSD. Fourth. the effects of
time-depcn denl se nsitizatio n can be excitat ory or inhibitory which accounts for the
intrusive ard avoidarce symptoms olmO. Finaly, timc-dcpcndent sensitization shows
in terindividuaJ va riability which is consist ent with the fac t that not all ind ividuals
exposed to trauma willdevelop sy m ptoms of PTSD (Ychuda and Antelman, 1993).
Th e Emotive Biasi ng M od el or YrSD
A final anima) model of PTSD worthdiscussing is that of emotive biasing (Adamec ,
1978). Pit man et a l. (I993) have suggested that emotive bi a sing ma y account for the
lasting changes in emotional disposi tion found in PT SD.
Emotiv e biasing combines ele ments o f boththe kindling and sensit ization models.
The hypothesisbeh indemotivebiasingis tha t repeated stimulationof the limbic substrate
of a speci fic emotional sta te ultima tely alter s the subs traieand results in an enh ancement
of its func tioning (Adamec, 1978). This idea Isccnststea with Kolb's (1987) theorythat
PTSOis the resu lt of cortical neuro nal death andsyna ptic changes that occur as a result
of excessiveand pro longed sensitizationof limbic structures in respo nse10 trauma.
In support of Kolb's ( 1987)theory two recent stu d iesem ploying magnetic resonance
imaging have found reduc ed hippocampal volumes in individuals with PTSD. Bremner.
Randall, Scott, Bronen, Seibyl, Southwick , Delaney , McCarthy, Charney and Innis
(1995) report tha t individuals wit h PTSD have smaller right hippocampal volumes in
comparison to age matched nonpsychiatric controls. In comparison to comba t vctcrans
without PTSDand non-PTSD, non-veterans. combat veterans withPTSD have also been
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found to exhibit signifK:.antly reduced len and right hippocampi (Gurvits, Shenton,
Hokama, Ohta, Lasko, Orr, Kikinis. Jolese, McCarley, and Pitman, unpublished
manuscript). While the reduced volumesobserved in the individuals with PTSD may be
the resultof exposure 10 trauma, Gurviu et al. (unpublishedmanuscript)alsosuggest thai
individuals with pre-existing hippocampal abnormalities may be more vulnerable 10
developing PTSD in response 10 trauma.
Adamec' s emotive biasing theory is basedon his studiesof feline defensive behavior.
Feli ne defensive behavior meets the majority of the crileria for an animal model of
anx iety (Adamec , 1990). Adamec (I978) has found that cats di ffer in defensive
behaviour. On the basisof their response upon exposure 10 a rat, cats can becategorized
as either "rat killers- or "non-rat killers- (Adamec, 1978). Cats thai arc rat killers attack
the rat and kin it and exhibit lillIe defensive behaviour. Non-rat killers erhibit a variety
of defensive behaviours when exposed to the rat (Adamec, 1978). Because such
differences in defensive response are seen very early in life it is possible thai some
animals may be born wilh a predisposition to respond defensively to Ihrealening stimuli
(Adamec, 1991).
Adamec (1978; 1990; 1991) has found that it is possible to alter defensive behaviour
in cats. Partial kindling in the feline limbic system increases defensive rcsponsivity in
cats to a number of stimuli (Adamec, 1990; 1991). Although reversible, this change in
responsivity can be very long lasting (Adamec, 1990).
It appears that in cats defensive response 10threat is the result of three factors; ( I)
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increased excitability of limbic cells 10 threatening stimuli; (2) a biased routing of
sensoryinformationprocessedin theamygdala10the ventromedialhypothalamiccircuitry
of defense and (3) a biased ro uting of excitatory activity away from the ventral
hippocampus, which ha s been shown to facilitate aggressive pred ation and reduce
defensive behaviour (Adamec,1991).Adamec(1991)hasshownthat partial ki ndlingof
the ventral hippocampus produce s a lasting increase in defensive behaviour in cats to
rats. This enhan cement appears 10depend on the growth of seizure activi ty in the
ventromedial hypothalamus and the amygdala of the cat, suggesting the importance of the
amygdala-ventromec'al hypothalamic pathwayin increased defensive response to rats
(Adamec,1991) .
Further support for feline defensive behavioras a model of human anxiety comes
from the finding that the bela carboline inverse agonist , FG·7142, increases feline
defensive behavior ina behavioral andphysiologicalmanne r almost identical 10that of
partial limbic kindling(Adamec, 1990; 1991; 1994). The relevance oftbis finding is that
FG·7142 produces anxiety inhumans (Adamec, 1990).
According to Pitman et at. (1993) emotive biasing can not be explained by
conditioning because the rat stimulus is not presented during the electrical or
pharmacologically induced acqv.siuon. As well, the increase in defensive responding
occurs across all situation s (Pitman et at. , 1993). Pitman et aI. (1993) suggest that the
concept of increased unconditional responding may expla in features of PTSD such as
irritability, hypervigilance, andexaggerated startle. Theseare allfea turesof PTSDthat
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can not beexplainedby a conditioning modeland are moreaccurately seen as being the
result of consistent emotively biasedfear (Pitman et aI., 1993).
To strengthen the applicabilityof emotive biasingas a modelof PTSD. Pitmanet aI.
(1993) sugges t that it should bedemonstratedthat lasting ahcrations in temperament can
be prod uced by more nallmJ stimuli lhan electrical or pharm acological stimulation.
Adamec and Shal low (1993) havcconducted such a study. In their study, ra ts were given
a single five minute exposure to a cat. Anxiety behaviour was then measured in the
elevated plus maze I, 2, 7, 14, or 21 days after cat exposure. Increased anxiety, in
co mparison to controls, was found in the elevated plus maze I to 21 days after cat
exposure. Severity of anxiety waspredictedby the approach behaviour of the cat which
is analogous to Foy, Sipprellc, Rueger, and Can oll' s (1984) report that in Vietnam
veterans, a significant portion of lhe variance in PTSD severity. can beaccounted for by
the extent and severity of combat ell. posure. Adamec and Shallow (1993) state that the
findings of their study suggest that the increasedanll.iety observed in rodents in lhe
elevated plus maze following exposure to a cat may modet me acuteand chronic anll. iety
seen in individuals with PTSD.
All of the models discussed above imply that manyof the symptoms of PTSD may
be the result of alterations in the specific neural systems that have been shown to be
involved in the stress response and anxiety in animals. Future studies may be able to
confirm these samealterations in human subjectsthrough the sophisticated techniques of
magnetic resonance imaging and positronemission topography.
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The Present Study
Oneof the three symptom clusters included in the DSM-IV ( 1994) diagnostic criteria
for PTSD is persistent increased arousal. Symptoms in this cluster include irritability or
outbursts of anger and exagge rated startle response. Severalfactor analytic studies have
bee n conducted that confirm these sympt oms of increased arousal in PTSD (Keane,
Caddell, and Taylor , 1988; Silver and Iacono, 1984; waucn , Kuala, lu ba, Manifold,
Anderson, and Anderson, 1988).
Increased levels of aggression, anger, and hostility have been found in combat
veterans with PTSD in comparison to combat veterans without PTSD (Beckham,
Roodman, Barefoot, Haney, Helms, Fairbank, Hertzberg,& Kudler, 1996; Chemtob,
Hamada, Roiiblat, and Muraoka, 1994: Lasko, Gurvits, Kuhne, Orr, and Pitman, 1994).
As was discussed previously, exaggerated startle has also been found to be a prominent
symptom of combat related PTSD.
The finding of increased hostility among combat veterans with PTSD (Beckham eI
aI•• 1996; Chemtob et al, 199..&; Laskoeral., 1994) may haveserio us health implications
for theseindividuals. Numerous studies have reponed an increased riskof coronaryheart
disease and atherosclerosis in individuals with high levels of hostility (Lachar, 1993;
Littman, 1993; Pastcrnac and Talajic, 1991; Shekelle, Gale, Ostfeld, and Oglesby, 1983;
Suarez and Williams, 1989; Williams, Haney, Lee, Kon&, Blumenthal and Whalen,
1980). Kubany, Gino, Denny , and Tc rigce (1994) slate that hostility in combal veterans
with PTSD may increasetheir risk for cardiovascular disease.
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While it is unknownif increased arcusability,as evidencedby the exaggeratedstante
response, posesany majorhealth concernsforveteranswith PTSD, it isone of themost
frequently occurring symptoms in these individuals (Keane, 1993).
Given the problems that these symptomspose to individuals suffering from PTSD,
a worthwhile task for PTSD research might be to determine which aspects of this
disorder are related 10 the increased le vels of hostility and stante response found in
individualswith combat relatedPTSD. An analytic technique which may be of assistance
in this endeavouris causal modelingwith path analysis.
According to F'assinger (1987) causal modeling with path analysis is a useful
technique for psychological research in that it enablesa researcher 10 use correlational
and nonexperimcntal data to lest the applicabilityof theirtheoretical models to a specific
sample . Pathanalysisrequiresthe researcher toprepare statementsthat describe possible
causal relationshipsbetween a number of variables(Biddle and Martin, 1987). These
statements are most often theoretically based on the currentlyavailable literature in the
relevant fieldof research. Once a pathmodel has beenconstructed it is assessedagainst
a data set that contains a correlation matrix showingthe observed relationships among
measuresof variables collectedduring research(Biddleand Martin. 1981). A modelis
said to beconfirmedif the correlations in the matrixmatch thosethat would havebeen
predictedbythe model (Biddle and Martin. 1987). Numerousstatistica l testsarc available
to assess the "goodness of fit" of a model to thedata (Specht, 1975). It is aha possible
to compare several theory based modelsto determinewhich maximizes the goodnessof
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fit crit e ria (Biddle and Martin, 19 87). Causal models tested in one .sa mple can also be
assessed byapplying them to a new datasample (Biddleand Martin, 1987).
Based on what is known about anxiety, thestartle response, hostility, and guilt it is
possible to create several path models of possible relationships among thesevariables in
PTSD. One such model is presented in Fi gure I.
In this model, it is hypothesized that the trauma of combat exposure lea ds to an
increase in trait anxiety. Several st udies have reported increased leve ls of trait anxiety,
as measured by Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), in veterans with
PTSD when compared to non-PTSD combat controls (Hovens, Falge r , Op den Velde,
DeGroen, and Van Ouijn , 1994: Hovens, Op den Velde, Falger, Schouten, De Groen,
and Van Ouijn, 1992: Orr et al., 19 95), Adamec's (1978; 199 1) emoti ve biasing studies
with ca ts and Adamec an d Shallow's (1994) studies in rats suggest that this increase in
trait anx iety may be due to the tra uma of combat lastingly al tering the neural substrate
of anx iety/fear in these individuals and th us making them more anxious/ fearfu l. As
indica ted in the model, this increase in the trait co mponent of anxiety may then also
increase an individual' s state anxie ty. Scores on the trait scale of the STAI have been
found to be positively co rrelated, in normative samples, with scores o n the stale scale
(Spielbe rger, 1983) . Similar findings have been reported for college students (Martin,
Blair, a nd Hatzel, 1987) and high school students (Layton, 1987). Th us, in the present
model the path fro m trait to state anxiety suggests that individuals who have h igh levels
o f ualt anxiety will experien ce high levels of anxiety in response to any situa tion or
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STARnE
Fi gure 1. A possible model of the relationsh ip between combat
exposure, anxiety, startle, hostility , and guilt in PTSD.
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object they perceive as threatening.
The previously discussed findings regarding the effects of high anxiety/fear on the
startle response in animals and humans suggest that anxiety in PTSD may lead to
increased startle response magnitude in sufferers of thisdisorder. This idea is shown in
the model by a path leading from stateanxiety to startle, Thus, increasedstartle in PTSD
may be a form of the fear-potentiated startle seen in animals.
Lasko et aJ. (l994) stale that the increased hostility in their subjects with combat
related PTSD is net explainedby the amount of combat exposure experienced by the
individual. Beckham et al. (1996) report similar findings in their study of Vietnam
combat veterans with PTSD. Thus, while combatexposure increases the risk for PTSD,
hostility is a part of PTSD rather than the result of combatexposure(Laskoet aI., 1994),
One possible cause of increased hostility in combat related PTSD may be anxiety,
Evidence exists to support the idea that anxiety increases hostility. Bourne (1971)
describes members of a SpecialForcesteam in Vietnamwho would engage in externally
directed hostile behaviour to alleviate feelings of vulnerability in response to any
environmental threat. Deffenbacher, Demm, and Brandon (1986)report that subjectsin
their study who were found to be high in general anger were also high in trait anxiety.
To reduce anger, Dcffenbacher et al. (l986) suggested using interventions aimed at
reducinggeneral anxiety. In addition, Katz, Wetzler, Cloitre, Swann, Secunda, Mendels,
and Robins (1993) report that while anxiety in depressed women is related to motor
retardation, anxiety in depressed men is highly related 10 hostility. They suggest that
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while their findings only apply to anxious depression they may be applicable 10 other
anxiety disorders (Katz et al., 1993).In termsof PTSD, Hovens ct at. (1992) have found
that anxiety and anger are highly related to each other in this disorder. Hovcns ct at.
(1992) suggest that their findings indicate Ihat uncontrollableanxiety makes one angry.
In a recent study, Dutton (1995) reports that abusive men with a PTSD-like profile
experienceincreasedlevels of chronic anger in a wide rangeof situations. Dutton (1995)
suggests that, for these men, aggression/hostility may serve 10dissipateanxiety. Thus.
in men with PTSD, hostility maybea reaction to the increased levels of anxietyIf car thcy
experienceas a resultof thedisorder.
While guilt is no longer includedas a symptom of PTSD in DSM~IV (1994), a
number of Vietnam veteransexperience guilt over their behavior (Watson et al., 1991;
Glover, Pelesky, Bruno, & Sette, 1990). It is possible that veterans with PTSD
experience guilt as a result of their increased levels of hostility. Palticl (1981) has
proposed a causal pathway for the violence that occurs in spousal abuse. According to
Paltiel (1981), for a spouse abuser, the perception of threat leads to an increase in
anxiety. Increased anxiety leads to hostility and/or aggression which then leads to guilt.
This same cycle may be applicable to Vietnam veterans.
The previouslydiscussedinformation supports theviabilityof the above modelof the
relationship between trauma, anxiety, exaggeratedstartle, hostility, and guilt. However,
as previously mentioned,it is possible to compare a numberof theory based models to
determine which maximizes the goodness of fit criteria (Biddleand Martin, 1987). In
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fact , many researchers state that testing of alternative models should be undertaken
especially when knowledge in the area of interest is not complete enough to provide a
single model specification (Bollen & Long, 1992; Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991; Raykov,
To mer, & Ncsselroade , 1991).
Thus, it is the aim of the present study to lest the applicability of the above
hypothesized model and severalplausible alternative models, which willbe discussed in
later sections, to a sample of Vietnamveteranswith PTSD. A comparison of the models
will allowus to determine which, if any, best represent the relationshipsbetweenanxiety,
hostility, guilt . and startle in PTSO.
Byrne (1994) stales thai a rare but valuable practice in the area of modelingis to test
the gcneralizability of a model by cross-validating it over independent samples.
Therefore, the modelsin the present study will be assessed and modifiedas necessary
and then applied 10 a second data set.
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Method
Subjeds.
A total 0(39 Vietnamcombatveteranswho met DSM·IlI·R (1987)criteria for PTSD
and 34 Vietnam combat veterans without P'TSD took part in the study.
Subjects in Sample I included 24 Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD and 24 non-
PTSD Vietnam combat veteran controls who participated in the Chcmtob et al. (1994)
study. All data wascollectedby Chemtobet at (1994). Veteranswithpsychoses, organic
mental disorder, current alcohol or substance abuse or dependence, or anti-social
personality disorder were excludedfrom the study.
Subjects in Sample 2 included 15 Vietnamcombat veteranswith [YfSD and to non-
PTSD Vietnam combat veteran controls. Subjects were participants in both the Lasko et
al . (1994) and the Orr et a!. (1995) studies. All data was collected solely by the
researchers involved in these two studies. Excluded from the studies were individuals
with a DSM·III ·R (1987) diagnosis of a current organic mental, bipolar manic.
schizophrenic, paranoid , delusional. or other psychotic disorder, or with alcohol or other
substance dependence or abuse within the past year. Also excluded were individuals with
a history of gross trauma or diagnosable neurologic disorder . None of the subjects had
used psychotropic or other medications with potentially confounding neurologic or
cognitive effects for at least two weeks prior tu examination.
14 PTSD veterans in Sample 1 had a concurrent disorder : 10 had mood disorders.
I had social phobia, and 3 had both a mood disorder and an anxiety disorder other than
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PTSD (of these 3, 2 veterans had panic disorders and 1 had agoraphobiawithout panic
disorder). One non-PTSD control subject had a mood disorder. Comorbid axis I
disorders in PTSD subjects in Sample 2 included4 current and 5 past major depression,
4 currentdysthymia, and 2 current generalizedanxiety disorders. Some subjects had
more than one comorbid axis I disorder. Axis I disorders in the non-PTSD control
subjects included one current and one past major depressionand one current dysthymia
disorder.
Materials.
Anxiety was measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger,
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; see Appendix A). The STAI is a 40 item
self-administered test of two aspects of anxiety. The Stateanxiety componentof the lest
asks the subject to indicate howthey feel at the presentmoment.Trait anxiety is assessed
by having the subject indicate how they "genera lly" feel.
Hostility was measured with the Hostility Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 1957; see
Appendix B). The Hostility Inventoryconsistsof 75 true-false items each representing
oneof seventypes of hostilityincluding assault,indirect hostility, irritability, negativism,
resentment, suspicion, and verbal hostility. The sum of theseseven hostilityscalesyields
a tolai scale on the instrument. In addition to the hostility subscales, the inventory
includesa guilt subscate.
The combat exposure of subjects in Sample 1 was assessed with the Combat
Exposure Scale (CES; Lund, Foy, Sipprelle, & Strachan, 1984; see Appendix C). The
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CES is a Guttman scale in which eight items describing stressful events related 10
military experience in Vietnam are hierarchically arrangedto reflect increasingly more
intense combat exposure.
Combat exposure was assessed for subjects in Sample 2 with the Legacies Comba t
Scale -Revised (Egendorf , Kadushin, Laufer , Rothbart . & Sloan . 1981; sccAppcndix D).
The Legacies consists of 10 hierarchical self-report items that deal with a number of
combat situationsa subject mayhave experiencedin Vietnam.The lower six items arc
scored ~ I- if applicable ; the remaining four items are scored "2". A score of I to 4 is
cons idered light co mbat exposure, 5 109 moderate, and 10 to 14 heavy combat expos ure .
Foy , Siprelle. Rueger, and Carro ll (1984) have found the Lega cies Combat Scale to be
highl y correlated with the CFS . Fontana and Rosenbeck (1993) report similar findings.
Th us. after rescaling the scores on the CES , the Legacies and CES were taken to be
equivalent meas ures of comba t exposure for subjects in this study.
The stimuli, dependen t physiologic measures, and procedure employed by Orr et al.
(1995) to meas ure the physical responsivlty (startle) o f subjects in Sample 2 were the
same as those employed by Shalev et at. (1992). Stimul i co nsisted of 15 95·dB , 1000 Hz,
500 ms pure to nes with 0 ms rise and fall times. Stimuli were presented binaurally ove r
headphones with intert rial interva ls randomly selected by a computer and ranging from
27s to 52s. Wh ile data for skin co nductance and heart rate were available from the Orr
et al . (1995) s tudy, the on ly dependent physiologic meas ure of interest for the presen t
study was the left orbicu laris oculi electromyogra m (EMG). This measure was chosen
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because, in humans, the acoustic startle reflex is measured as the magnitude of the
eyeblink, EMG response, component of the reflex (Morgan et aI., 1995).
Subjects were seated comfortably in a humidity- andtemperature-controlled, sound-
attenuated room. Afler the recording electrodes were attached, subjects were given the
following instructions:
Youa TC going to heara seriesof tones. Pleasesit quietly and listen to thesounds as
theycome. Keepyoureyesopenthroughout theentire procedure, whichwillnotlast
more than twentyminutes. There willbea five-minute restingperiod before the
tones begin. Do you have any questions?
A technician then placedearphones on the subject and left the room. Participation
was monitored through closed circuit television. EMG responsewas sampled at the rate
of 2 Hz during the five-minute rest period after which the first tone was presented
without warning. Sampling frequencywas increased to 50 Hz at 4s prior to each tone
presentationand continued at this rate until 8.Ss after each tone onset.
An EMG response score for each of the IS tone trials was calculatedby subtracting
the mean EMG level during the I second immediatelypreceding tone onset from the
highest EMG level measuredwithin 40 to 200 milliseconds after tone onset. The EMG
responses were then averaged across the IS trials.
Scoreson the MississippiScale for Combat-Related Post-TraumaticStress Disorder
(Keane, Caddell, & Taylor, 1988;see Appendix E) were also available for all subjects
in both samples. The Mississippi Scale is a 35 item, Likert scale, self-report
questionnaire specifically designed to assess PTSD symptoms in Vietnam combat
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veterans. Subjects' scores on this measure were used solely in the present siudy as
predictor variables in regression equations employed10replace missing values of other
variables.
Slatisti cal Analys is
As previously discussed,causal modeling withpath analysis is a multivariate analytic
technique that allows a researcher to lest for possible causa l relationships among a
number of variables. Given the difficulties encountered in treating the symptoms of
PTSD and tlle potentially life threatening nature of symptoms such as hostility, path
analysiswasemployed in the present study in an attempt to elucidatethe natureof the
relationships between anxiety, hostility, guilt, and increased startle reactivity in Vietnam
veterans with PTSD. By better understanding these relatio nships, it may be possible to
determ ine the most efficient and successful means o f treating these symptoms. In the
following section the hypothesized model and several enc matlve models are presented
along with the results of the path analyses conducted on these models.
.;;
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Results
Data Scree ning
Prior to analysis all variables for bothsamples were examined through several NCSS,
BMDP, and £OS programs for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between
their distributions and the assumptions of multivariate analysis. 'The issue of kurtosis is
discussed later within the model construction section. The variables were examined
separately for each sample and for the subjects with PTSD and the non-PTSD combat
control subjects within each sample.
M issln&Values
In both Sample I and Sample 2, four cases were found to have missing values. State
anxiety and education were the only variables to have missing values. Due to the small
sizes of the samples it was decided to estimate the missing data . An acceptable method
for estimating missing values is to use regression equations (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989).
In the present study, the BMDP (1990) program 9R was used to compute regression
equations employing the best set of predicto rs from each data sample for each variable
with missing values. These equations were then used to compute scores to replace the
missing data points where necessary. Table 1 shows the variables and the R' for the
regression equation used to compute missing values of state anxiety in Sample 1. Table
2 shows the same information for the regression equation used to compute missing values
of state anxiety in Sample 2. Finally, Table 3 shows the variables and the R' value for
the regression equation used to compute missing values of educati on in Sample 2.
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Table I. BMDPbest predictor equationfor state anxietyin Sample I (N=48)
Variable
Mississippi Scale
BussDurkee Assault
Buss Durkee Indirect
BussDurkeeResentment
BussDurkeeTotal
Intercept
"'R1_O.7941I, p<.OOOI
Regression Coefficient
0.451533
1.75992
3.38975
3.67336
-1.00922
-23.04430
Table 2. BMDPbestpredictor equationfor stateanxiety in Sample 2 (N=25)
Variable
Mississippi Scale
Intercept
Regression Coefficient
0.485810
0.51Om
Table 3. BMDP best predictorequationfor educationin Sample 2 (N==25)
Variable
LegaciesCombatScale
MississippiScale
BussDurkeeTotal
BussDurkee Assaultive
Buss Durkee Irritable
Buss Durkee Negative
BussDurkeeSuspicion
Intercept
Regression Coefficient
0.208117
-0.057005
0.455551
-0.639633
-0.443894
-1.063333
-0.924394
14.594800
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Outli ers
Path analysis is highly sensitiveto the inclusion of univariate outliers, caseswith
extremevalueson one variable, and multivariate outliers,cases with extremevalues on
a combination of variables (fabachnik and Fidell , 1989). While the NeSS screening
program showed there to be no multivariate outliers in either Sample 1 or Sample 2,
histograms revealed that several variables with univariate outliers existed in both
samples.
As the variables found to have univariate outliers were an integral part of the
analysis, steps were taken to reducethe influence of the outliers. Tabachnik and Fidel!
(1989) suggest that one way of dealing with outliers is to change the score on the
relevant variable for the outlying case so that it is deviant but not as deviant as it was.
This can be done by assigning the outlying case a score on the variable that is one unit
larger or smaller than the next most extreme score in the distribution (fabachnik and
Fidell , 1989).
In the non-PTSD control group of Sample I, one case was identified as an outlier
due to an extreme score on the Buss Durkee assault subscale. The score for this case was
changed from 8 to 4, one above the next lowest score. Two cases with high scores on
the Buss Durkee suspicion subscale had their scores changed from 6 and 9 to 3, one
above the next highest score.
Examination of the data for the non-PTSD control group from Sample 2 revealed
several univariate outliers. Two cases were identified as having extreme SCOles on the
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trait anxiety measure. Their scores was changed from 8 to 22 and 77 10 46 respectively .
Two cases were outliers due to high state anxiety scores. Their scores were changed
from 35 and 39 to 23. one above the next highest score. One case was an outlier due
to a high score on the Buss Durkee suspicion subscale. Their score was changed from
8105.
One case in the PTSD group of Sample 2 was identified as an outlier due to a low
score on the Buss Durkee irritabil ity subscale. The score for this subject was changed
from 3 to 5.
Group Demographic. Psychometrie, and Physiologic Means
Groupdifferences onthedemographic, psychometric, andphysiologic measures were
assessedwithinthe twodatasamplesfor tworeasons. Firstly,thedatasci compiled from
Lasko et al (1994) and Orr et al. (l99S) was based on a reduced sample size and thus it
was important 10 report the descriptivestatistics for the reduced data set. Secondly,
reporting the group differences within each sample provides a general picture of the
characteristicsof the two samples. Havinga picture of the two samplescan aid in the
interpretationof the pathanalysis. For example,comparingwheredifferenceslie within
the two samplesmay helpin accountingfor possiblenoninvariances in pathcoefficients
when a modelis testedon the two samples.
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviationsof the demographic, combat
exposure, anxiety, hostility, guilt, and physiologicmeasuresfor subjectsin Sample I.
Table 5 shows the meansand standarddeviationsof the samevariablesfor subjects in
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Sample 2.
The P'fSD and non-PTSD subjects in both Sample I and Sample 2 did not differ
significantly in age or amount of education. Nor did the two samples differ on these
The re was no significant group difference in Sample I with regards to amount of
combat exposure, althoughthe meanexposurescores wereslightly higher for the combat
veteran control subjects. In contrast to Sample I, the veterans with PTSD in Sample 2
reported experiencing significantly more combat exposure than the veterans without
PTSD.
Veterans with PTSD in Sample 1 and Sample2 had significantlyhigher scores than
con trol subjects on the stale component of the STAI, Veterans with PTSD in Sample I
also had significantly higher scores than control subjects on the trait component of the
STAt In a similar fashion, veterans with PTSD in Sample 2 had higher scores than
control s on the trai t component of the STAI, though the group difference was weaker
than in Sample I, F(t,23) =3 .88, p< .07: equivalent t(23)= 1.97, p < .03 1, Hailed . A
one -tailed t-test is justified in this instance given the numerous studies reporti ng that
veterans with PTSD have significantly higher levels of trait anxiety than combat veteran
controls without PTSD (Chemtob et aI., 1994; Hovens et aI., 1994; Hovens et aI., 1992;
Hye r, O'Leary, Saucer, Blount, Hamson , & Boudewyns, 1986; Orr et aI., 1995).
Veterans with PTSD in both Sample 1 and Sample 2 had significantly higher total
scores on the Hostility Inventory than control subjects. Veterans with PTSD in bolh
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T.ble 4. Gro up demographic , psychometri c , U1d physiologic means and slAndlud dcvialions ror
Sample 1 (N .. 4S)
PTSD(n_24} Non-PTSD(n_24) F(I ,46)
Age (years) 43.38 +1-6.30 44.63+ /-5.03 0.58
EduCBlion(years) 15.92+ f-).44 15.00+(- 2.17 1.04
CombJIlExposure 9.10+ /·].43 10.27+ 1·2. 13 2.00
HostilityInventory
ASS/lult 7.17+ 1·2.28 4.54+ 1-2 .78 12.19-
Indire<:t 6.25+ /- 1.92 3.25+/-2.03 21.75'"
Irritabili ty 9.17+ /- 1.49 3.7:1+1- 2,62 76.20-
Negativism 3.58+ /-1.25 2.00+/· t .at 16.91-
Resentmen t 5.25+ 1-1 .87 1.63+ (·1.84 45.81-
Suspicion 6.21+ /-2.55 1.67+1-1.79 50.99-
Verbal 8.42+ 1-2.39 6.29+1·2.60 8.69'
Guilt s.R8+ 1- 1.8S 2.63+/-2 .14 31.64-
ToW 46.33+ /-8.12 23.67 +/ -11.21 64.36-
STAl
State An lliet)' 37.63+ /· 14.51 1.67+ /- 8.06 78. 13-
Trait Anxiely 54.04+1·12 .23 30.42+ /-1.19 66.56-
+", p< .OI, two-tailed
• • - p < .OOI , two--tailed
+++ - p < .OOOI , two-tailed
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T.b le S. Group d~mot: raphic . psychometri c, Ilfld physiologic means end SlI.ndard devianon s for
Simp le 2 (N_2S).
PTSD(n =JS) nonPTSD( n_ IO) FO. 23)
Age (yeafll) 4-4.00+ 1-2.04 46. 10+ 1-4.25 2.16
EduC8l ion(years) 14.40 + /- 1.88 IS.sO+ f· 2.88 1.35
o,mrnot E~po~ure 12.07+/- 1.44 9.40 + 1-4 .03 5.60-
lIosl j ljty ln~ntol)'
A'lSault 6.47 +/-2.90 3. 10 + /· 1.29 11.79"
Indirect 5.67+ 1-2.64 5.00+1·1.89 0.47
Irritability 8.40 +1-1 .92 5.60+ 1- 3.24 7.41 ·
Negativism 3. 13+ {· 1.60 2.70+ (·2.00 0.36
Resentment 5.40+ /·1.80 2.00 +1- 1.83 21.10 ·
Suspicio n 5.93+/- 1.98 1.80+1- 1.40 32.50-
Verba l 10.20+ /- 1.90 7.20 +( -2.04 14.11-
Guill 5.27+/-1.62 3.7 + /-1.10 5.31·
Tollli 45.00+ /-9.72 28.70+ '-12. 11 13.87-
STAI
SlIleA mliely 57.47+ 1.15.5' 36.20+ /- 12.81 12.8S "
TrailAnll.iety 48.20 +/-13 .15 31.30 +/-14.16 3.88
EloctromyogramR .A. l .08 + I· O.SS 0.43+/·0.33 Il .01"
+ .. p < .OS, two-c,Ued
• = p< .OI, two-Iailed
.. .. p <.OOI, two-tailed
... ,. p < .OOO I , rwc-tailed
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samples also had significantly higher scores than controls on the assault. irritability,
resentment , suspicion, verbal. and guilt subscales of the Hostili ty Inventory. While
veterans with PTSD in Sample 1 had significantly higher scores than controls in Sample
1 on the indirect and negativism subscales, no significant group differences existed on
these subscales for subjects in Sample 2.
With regards to physiologicalresponsivity,veteranswith PTSD in Sample 2 had, on
average, a significantly larger electromyogram response average than combat veterans
without PTSD. Physiological data were not available for the subjec ts in Sample I.
TIle Buss Durkee Hostility Invent ory : 111c Issue of Employing th e Tol ,,) Scor e Versu s
Scores on the Individu al Subsce tes
The total score on the Buss Durkee Hostility Invento ry is a composite score made
up of scores on the individual hostility subscales. Thus, an issue that needed to be
addressed before constructing any models, was whether to use the tota l score on the Buss
Durkee Hos tility Inventory to represent hostility with in our model or whether to conside r
employing individual hostility subscales.
To dete rmine which alternative was most appropria te it was decided to run two
discriminant analyses on the anxiety and hostility measures; one includ ing the Hostility
Inventory total score by itself and one which included both the total score and the
individual subscale scores. A comparison of the predictor variables selected for and the
accuracy of clas sification provided by the resulting discriminant functio ns of these two
analyses would then be possible. From these comparisons it could be detcrmi ned which
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aspect of the hostility scale. i.e which subscales or the total score, most reliably
represented hostility as a variable which discriminated PTSDfrom non-PTSD persons.
For this reason, analyses were run on both of the data samples.
Discriminant Analysis: Nommlity of Distributions
The D'Agostlno-Pearsonomnibus K2 lest was used to assess the normality of the
distributions of the relevant variables in the discriminant analyses. The only variable
found 10 have a nonnormal distribution was the Buss Durkee assaultive subscale
(K' = 6.36, p< .042) for the P'TSD subjects in Sample 1. However, as discriminant
analysis is robust with regards to nonnonnal distributions in which the smallest group in
the analysis is larger Ihan 20 (Tabachnik & Fidel!, 1989)it was decided to include this
variable in the analysesand not transform it.
Discriminant Analysis: Melhod
As there was no reason10assign any of the variables higher priority than others, a
stepwise discriminant analysis was used to produce the reduced set of predictors
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989). Wilks' Lambda was used to direct the progression of entry
of predictors in the analysis. This method produces the smallest values of Wilks' Lambda
i.e. the largest multivariate F values (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989).
In order to reduce classification bias and to ensure that the discriminant functions
derived from the analyses were valid, the jackknife, or leaveone out, method of cross-
validation was used (BeU, 1987; Huberty, 1994; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989).
Both analyses were performed using the BMDP7M (1990) stepwise jackknife
5B
discriminant analysis procedure. Prior probabilities of groupmembership were set at .50
and .50 for Sample I whh equalgroup size and .40 and .60 fo r sample 2 wi th unequal
numbers in the groups.
Discrimi nant Ana lysis I: lI ostilily Inventory Tota l Sc ore (No lIo!>1i1ily Subscales~
Stepwise discriminant function analysis tested the accuracy of inclusion in the
predetermined PTSD and non-PTSD groups basedon staleanxiety, trait anxiety. and the
Hostility Inventory total sco re,
Table Sashows the two variables usedin thediscriminant functionand the associated
standardized (by pooledwith-in group variances) canonical coefficients basedon the data
from Sample I. The variables, state anxiety and Hostility Inventory total score. are
shown in order of lheir inclusion in the discriminant function. State anxiety, as measured
by the STAI, was included in thefunction first as it was thevariable thai contributed fhe
most (i.e . had the smallest Wilks' Lambda and hence the targcsr F value) 10 the
separation of the group~ with respect10 the discriminant function.
As can be seen from Table 6b, the discriminant function procedure correctly
classified 9 1.7~ of the PTSD patients and 91.7 " of the non· PTSD subjects in Sample
I.
A stepwise discriminant analysis was run on the data trom Sample 2 using the same
variables as were entered in the firsl analysis with Ihe data from Sample I. Table 7a
shows the two variables, in order of inclusion, that were used in jhe discriminant
function and the associated standardized canonical coefficients. As was the case with
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T able 6a. Stepwise discriminant function anal ysis on Sample I (no Hosti lity Inventory
subscaJes ): cano nical variables '
Variable Standardized Coeffi cient
S tate Anxiety -0.66845
Hostility Inventory Total .0 .54686
Eigenvalues 2.30435
Cumulative Proporti on 1.00000
of Tota l Dispe rsio n
Canonical Correlations 0.83509
Constant 3.24486
• The remaining variable did not have a high enough F value to be included in the
d iscriminant function .
T able 6b . Stepwise discri minant function analysis on Sa mple I (no Hostility lnventory
subscales): jackknifed classification .
Percent Classified As :
Diagnostic Group
PTSD
Non-PTSD
PTSD
91.7
8.3
Non·PTSD
8.3
91.7
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Tabl e 7a. Stepwise discriminant func tion analysis on Sample 2 (no Host il ity Inventory
subscales): canonical var iab les-
Variable S tandardized Coefficient
Hostility Inventory To tal -0.66580
State Anxiety -0.63053
Eigenvalues 0.97760
Cumulative Proportion 1 . 0ססoo
of Total Dispersion
CanonicalCorrelations 0 .70309
Constant 4 .51594
... The remaining variabl e d id not have a high enough F value to be included in the
discriminant function.
Table Th. Stepwise discriminantfunction analysis onSample2 (no Hostility Inventory
subscales):jackknifedclassification.
Percent ClassifiedAs:
Diagnostic Group
PTSD
Non-PTSD
PTSD
93 .3
40.0
Non·PTSD
6.7
6O.D
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SampleI, the Hostility Inventory totalscore andstate anxiety weresignificant predictors
of group membership.However, for Sample 2, theHO$lility Inventorytotalscore, rather
thanSlate anxiety. contributedthe mostto the group separation basedon thediscriminant
function.
The discriminant function procedure correctly classified 93.3% of subjects wit h
P'TSD and 60.0% of non-PTSDsubjectsin Sample2 (Table 7b). The classification rate
for PTSD subjects is comparable to that obtained with Sample I. However, there is
considerablymore mlsctassiflcationof control subjects inSample2.
Dlserlmlnant AnalY5 l~ n: lIostility Invent ory Total Score and Hostility Subscale
Scores
The totalscore onthe Hostili ty Inventory wasa significant discriminating variable
on the analyses fo r both data samples. As the total score is comprised of the sco res on
the seven individual hostilit y subscales, a second discriminant analysis was run on the
two samp les this time with both the bostllhy subscales and the Hostility Inventory total
score incl uded. From this analysis it would be possible to determine if one specific aspect
of hostility, as measured by thesubscates, best differentiated the PTSD and non·PTSD
groups in place of the total score. If thisshould be the case the n that subscale o r set uf
subscalcs would be chosen to represent hosti lity in our models.
Table Sa show s , in order of thei r inclusion, the tw o variables that were used in the
discrimi nant functio n and the associated canonical coefficients based on the data from
Samp le 1. As with the first analysis. state anx iety is a significant predictor of gro up
ea
Table 8a. Stepwise discriminant function analysis on Sample I (Hostility Inventory
subscale scores and total score includcd):canonical variables"
Variable
State Anxiety
BussDurkeeSuspicion
Eigenvalues
Cumulative Proportion
of Total Dispersion
Canonical Correlations
Constant
Standardized Coefficient
-0.77065
-0.61423
2.72601
1.0ססoo
0.85535
2.58418
• The additional 8 variablesdid not have high enough F values to be included in the
discriminantfunction.
Table Sb. Stepwise discriminant function analysis on Sample I (Hostility Inventory
subscale scores and total scores inc1uded):jackknifcd classification,
Percent Classified As:
DiagnosticGroup
PTSD
Non·PTSD
PTSD
91.7
8.3
Non-PTSD
8.3
91.7
6 3
Table 9a. Stepwisediscriminant functionanalysison Sample 2 (Hostility Inventory
subscale scores and total scores included):canonicaJ variables ·
Variable
Buss Durkee Suspicion
Eigenvalues
Cumulative Proportion
of Total Dispersion
CanonicalCorrelations
Constant
StandardizedCoefficien t
-1.00000
1.41324
1.00000
0.76526
2,41012
• The additional 9 variables did not have high enoug h F val ues to be included in the
discriminant function.
Table 9b. Stepwise discriminant function analysis on Sample 2 (Hostilit y Inventory
subscaJe scores and lotal scores included):jackknifed classification.
PercentClassified As:
Diagnostic Group
PTSD
Non-PTSD
PTSD
86.7
0.0
' 3.3
100.0
••
membership.However. the Hostility Inventorytotal score has been replaced in the
discriminant function by the suspicionsubscalescore.
As shownin Table Bb,this seconddiscriminant function correctly classified91.7%
of the subjects with PTSD and 91.7% of the control subjects in Sample 1. These
classification rates are identical to those found with the analysis that did not include the
hostilit y subscales.
The variableusedin the discriminant function basedon Sample 2 andthe associated
standard ized canonical coefficient are shown in Table 9a. In Ihis analys is only one
variable, suspicioushostility,was included in thediscriminant function. Asoccurredwith
Sample 2, the suspicion subscale scorereplacedthe Hostility Invento ry total SCOfe in the
discriminant function.
As per Table 90, this discriminant functioncorrectly classified 100%of the control
subjects and 86.7% of the subjects with PTSD. These rates are sim ilar 10 those found
with Sample1. However, in comparison to Ihe analysis thai did not include the Hostility
Inventory susbscales, the discriminant functionproducedby Ihisanalysisvastly improved
classification of control subjects but loses some accuracy ln terms of PTSD subject
classification.
Analys is of Cova riance
As reported above,the suspicionsubscaleof the Hostility Inventorywas a significant
predicto r of group membership for both samples and in fact provided be tter overa ll
classificationfor subjectsin Sample 2 than the HostilityInventory total score. It wasthus
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possible that this subscatecharacterizeshostility in veterans rather than the totalhostility
score, Toaddress this issuethe contributionof suspicioushostility to differencesbetween
PTSD and control veterans in other aspects of hostility was examined . Analyses of
cova riance were used 10 remove the influence of suspicio us hostility on the other
subsca fes and total scores of the Hostility Inventory for both data sets.
The F values obtained with rhe covariance analyses are shown in Table 10 for
Sample I and in Table II fo r Sample 2. For both Sample I and Sample 2 assault,
resen tment, and verbal subscales, group differences depended o n suspicio us hostility.
Covarying suspicioushostility scores out of these measures removed group differences
(P> .05) . However, while covarying suspicion out of the Hostility Inventory total score
and the irritable subscale for Sam ple 2 removed statistical group d ifferences (p> .05),
group differences in these vari ables remained significant in Sample I with suspicion as
a cova riate (p < .005).
Covarying suspicion from the nega tivism subscale for Sample I removed group
differences while group differe nces rem ained statis tically significant for the indirect
subscal c (P< .01). There were no group differences on these two subscales for Sample
2 ho wever, so analysis of covariance was not run on these variab les.
The results of these analyses of covariance sugges t that while suspicious hostility may
be a significant discriminating variable when classifying combat veterans with and
witho ut PTSD , it does not capture all aspec ts of hostility experienced by comba t veterans
sufferi ng from PTSD. The present analyses suggest that hostility is e xpressed in different
6.
Table 10. F and probability valuesof group differences on hostilitymeasures with Buss
Durkee suspicion subscale as covariate based on Sample I (N =48)\
Variable
Buss Durkee Assault
Buss Durkee Indirect
Bu ss Durkee Irritability
Buss Durkee Negativism
Buss Durkee Resentment
Buss Durkee Verbal
Buss Durkee Total Score
F(I ,45)
1.24
8,79
19.58
2.99
2,85
0.42
9.15
p (two-tailed )
0.2718
0.0048
0.0001
0.0907
0 .0985
0 .5214
0.0041
I See Table 4 for original co mpariso ns
T able 11. F and probability values o f group differences on hostility meas ures with Buss
Durkee suspicion subscale as covariatebased onSample 2 (N =25)1
Variable
Buss Durkee Assault
Buss Durkee Indirect"
Buss Durkee Irritability
Buss Durkee Negativism"
Buss Durkee Resentment
Bu ss Durk ee Verbal
Buss Durkee Total Score
F(I ,22)
0.98
0.19
0.68
1.44
0.10
P (two-tailed)
0 .3329
0.6698
0.41 82
0.243 3
0.7608
·Covariance analysis not done, see text.
I See Table 5 for original comparison s
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forms, withindifferentpopulations . Inthis senseuse ofthe Hostility Inventory totalscore
is more likely to uncover hostility difference perse. Attention to individualsubscales in
different populations is also warranted, though replicability acrosssa mples may beless
likely for individual subscales than for the total score. Thu s, for the purposes of the
present study the Hostility Invento ry total score will beused to represe nt hos tility.
Path Anal)'sis - Model Construction
In order 10 better understand the nature of some of the symptoms of PT SD. path
analysis wasused toexaminethe relationships between trauma, anxiety, hostility, and
guilt. The path diagram for the hypothesized modelof these relationshipsis shown in
Figure 2. Thisdiagram, like those of all subsequent figures, follows the conventionsof
EQS version 5.1 (Bentler & Wu, 1995). Measured variables are sho wn in boxes and
unmeasured variables are shown in circles. Unidirectional arrows between variables
represent regression coefficients and indicate the influence o f one variable o n another.
positive coefficientsindicate a positiverelationship between the variables i.e. highscores
on one variable predict high scores on the other variable. Negative coefficients indicate
an invers e relationship between the two variables. Sourcelessone-wa y arrows represent
error terms, i.e. the residuals assoc iated with the measurementof the ob served variables.
The rationales for thevarious path s in the modelare discussed below .
A path is predicted from combat exposure to trait anxiety on the basis of animal
research that indicatesa relationship betweentraumaticevents andincreasedfear/anxiety.
Adamec' s (1978; 1991) emotive bi asing studieswith cats have found tha t partial kindling
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or pharmacological stimulation of brain areasassociatedwith fear/anxiety produce a long
lasting increase in felinedefensivebehavior which is considered analogous to anxiety in
humans. In addition, Adamec and Shallow(1993) reportthatexposure10 a cal, a natural
fear stimulus for a rodent,lastingly increases anxiety likebehaviors in rodents. Adamec
(1996) has argued that such anxiety increases in animals model aspects of anxiety
disorder following traumatic stress. These studies suggest that, in humans. the trauma
of combat may lastingly alter the neural substrate of anxiety/ fear in individuals with
PTSD and thus make them more anxiousffearful. It could be suggested that, rather than
exposure to traumaproducing an increase in trait anxiety, individuals high in trail anxiety
may be more predisposed to develop PTSD in responseto traumatic events. However,
Shalev , Peri, Canetti,and Shrciber(1996) have conducteda prc.pcctivc study ofpossi blc
pred ictors of PTSD in individuals exposed to road traffic accidents, wo rk and other
accide nts, terrorist acts, and armed assaults which suggests that trait anxie ty docs not
pred ispose an individual to PTSD. In their study, Shalev et al. (1996) found no
significant differencesin traitanxiety one week post trauma between those subjects who
went on to develop PTSD and those who did no t As it has beenconsistently shown that
individuals with PTSD experience significantly higher levels of trait anxiety than
individuals without PTSD (Havens et al., 1994; Hovens et al., 1992; Kuhne, Orr, &
Baraga, 1993; Orr et el. , 1995; Sutker, Bugg, & Allain, 1991) it would appear that
increased trait anxiety in PTSD is the result of exposure to trauma rather Ihan a
pred isposing factor for the development of PTSD.
·0.18
8
, P<.OS,Izi~ 1.96
0.87'
0.50
I
0.70$
0.71 '
0.59
I
Figure 2. Standard'lzcd solution orModell, data trom Sampl e I (N=48)
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Thus, a path from trauma to trait anxiety is justified in the present model from
human as well as animal data. Moreover, a positive path coefficient between trauma and
anxie ty is pred icted given lIlal high scores on the CES are related 10 higher lev els of
PTS D symptom intensity(Lund et al. , 1984).
A strong corre lation had been found between scores 0f1 the trai l and state components
of the STAI in normative samples (Spielberger , 1983). co llege students (Martin er aI. ,
1987), and high school students (Layton, 1987). In addition, Grillon et al. (1993)
reported that , in their study of anxiety and fear-potentiated startle, individuals who scored
high on the trail componentof theSTAI also scored higheron the statecomponent of the
STAt when threatened with a shock. Based on these findings, which support the logical
propo sition that an anxious individual will experience increased levels of anxiety in
response to situations that they perceive as threaten ing . a path, with a positive path
coe fficien t. is predicted from trait anxiety to state anxiety.
A path is also predicted from trait anxiety to hostility . II should be noted thai for all
models assessed in this study, hostility is represented by the total score on the Hostility
Inventory. Thi s is in keeping with the results o r the discriminant and covaria nce analyses
which sugge sted thai the total score is a more appropria te measure of hostility than any
of the indiv idual subscales . Increased hostility docs not appear to be related to the
amo unt o f combat an individual experiences (Lasko et al . , 1994; Beckham et al., 1996) .
Thu s, a path from combat exposure to hostility would not be predicted . Thcre is
considerable evidence 10 support the idea that increased hostility in PfSD is the result
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of increased levels of anxiety. Dcffenbacher et al. (1986) have found that subjects who
score high on measures of anger also score high in trait anxiety. Katz et al. (1993)
suggest thai host ility in depressed men may be related to high trait anxiety. Bourne' s
(1971) studies with v ietnam cc.nbat soldiers suggest that hostility may be a means of
dealing with anxiety provoking situations. This co rresponds to Hovens et al. ' s (1992)
suggestion thai the high correlation they found in their study between anger and trait
anxiety in veterans with PTSD is the reeult of uncontrollable anxiety making one angry.
Dutton (199S) also suggests that, in abusive men who exhibit a PTSD profile,
aggression/hostilitymay function to alleviate anxiety. Thus, indivirluals with PTSD who
arc high in trait anxiety may become more hostile in response to their increased feelings
of anxiety, A positive path coefficient is therefore expected between trait anxiety and
hostility.
Glover et al. (1990)report that many Vietnamveteransexperience considerableguilt
for having participated in aggressiveacts during the war. This is consistent with Paltiel's
(1981) proposition that for male spouse abusers, hostility and/or aggression leads to
feelings of guilt, Thus, individuals with PTSD who find themselves feeling and acting
more hostile as a result of their disorder may experienceconsiderable guilt as a response,
Thus, a path is predicted in this modelfrom hostility to guilt, A positivepath coefficient
is expected, indicating that individuals who exhibit more hostility experience more guilt.
Path Analysis: Method and Goodness of Fit Indices
The hypothesized model appears in Figure 2. This model was tested in the subject>
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'n Sample 1 (N=48) using EQS version 5.1 (Bentler & Wu, 1995). Mardia' s coefficient
generated by the EQS program and shown in Table 12 confirmed that none of the
variables being tested exhibited significant multivariate kurtosis.
All of the beta weights in this model were assessed as free parameters by the
maximumlikelihoodmethod. The correlationmatrix for Ihis modelis shownin Appendix
F.
Following Bollen and Long (1992), several indices of overall fit were used. In
accordance wilh Hoyle andPanter's (1995)recommendations. several fit indices were
chosen 10 assess the model. These are presented in Table 12. The chi-square (or the
hypothesized model is reported.The value of Ihis Xl should be nonsignificant indicating
a good fit of the data to the hypothesized model. Hoyle and Panter (1995) recommend
reporting Joreskog and Sorbcm's (1981) goodness-of-lit index (OFI) in addition to chi-
square. The GFl indicates the relative amount of observed variance and covariance
jointly accounted for by the model (Hoyle and Panter, 1995), Finally, Bentler"; (1990)
comparative tit index (CFI) was included. The CFt is the index of choice when dealing
with small samples (Bentler, 1990). Values for the CFI arc derived from a comparison
of the hypothesized model with the null model, the model which assumes all correlations
between variables equal zero (Byrne, 1994) . The CFI reflects the reduction in X2
associated with the hypothesized model versus the null model. For the GFI, '...atucs can
range between 0 and I. For the CFI, values arc 0 and forced to a ceiling of I. Values
greater than .90 on either index are taken 10 indicate an acceptable fit of the model to
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Tahle 12. Tahle of indices of fit for Model I l;o&Sed on tho:dala from Sample 1 (N-48)
Sample N Muimum Likelihood Xl OFI CFI Mardia's Nonna lized
Coefficient Esti/Tllltc '
48 X'(6)~4.IS I. p = .6S627 .965 1.00 -1.8908 -0.7829-
I The notmllliud estimate ", pre.'"," ls . t score which tests the significlIIIl:eof the coeffic ient based on the
expected value &$ per the ,,~umplion of . nonna l distribut ion.
· p > .OS Iwo-lRiled lesl ((1]> 1.96)
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the data (Byrne, 1994; Hull. Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991: Kline, 1991).
Individual path coefficients were tested for significance by the EQS programand
considered significant if p < .05, two-tailed(e-tesn.
Results of the Path Analysis
In terms of overall fit, the model in Figure 2 fits tbc data from Sample I quite well.
As shown in Table 12, the indicesof overall fit were very good. X1 for the hypothesized
modelwassmalland non-significant, X1(6,N= 48)=4. 151, p= .65627. ThcGFI was .965
and the CFI was 1.00.
The path coefficients between variables are shown in Figure 2. The paths between
trait anxiet y and slate anx iety, trait anxiety and host ility , and hostility and guilt were
significant (P< .05). However, the pathbetweencombat exposure and trait anxiety was
nonsignitkan t (P > .05) and thesign of the coefficient was also in the oppositedirection
to that predicted.
EQS provides two modification indices that can suggest waysof improving the lit of
a model. The multivariate laGrange Multiplier Test tells you how much the X2 for the
model will be improved by freeing each of the fixed parameters, the zero paths between
variables, in the model. Thus. the multivariate LaGrange Multiplier Test suggests
possible paths to add to the model to improve its fit. The Wald Test assesses whethersets
of free parameters in the model can be simultaneously set to zero without substantial loss
in model fit (Byrne, 1994) l.e. it tests multivariately for redundant paths in the model.
While the LaGrange MUltiplierTest did not indicate adding any paths to the model
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and the Wald lest did not suggest dropping any paths, findings from previous research
suggested reasons thai could account for the lackof significancein the path from combat
exposure 10 trait anxiety. On the basisof these findings, which will be discussedin the
next section. it was decided10modifyModel I and to assess the fit of this second model.
Model Respccmcetlon
In Model I , the coefficient for the path from combat exposure 10 trait anxiety was
not significantly different from zero and was opposite in direction to that predicted. A
negative sign for this path coefficientwasconsistentwith the data from Sample I, given
that there was a nonsignificant trend for PTSD subjects, who were significantly higher
in trait anxietythan control subjects. to reportexperiencing less combatexposurethan
control subjects.
DSM-IV (1994) redefines the nature of the stressor responsible for PTSD. In this
latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, emphasis is shifted away from the
severity o f the stressor 10 a mixture of exposure to a traumatic event and an individual's
reactio n 10 it. This new definition indicates that the person's perceptio n of the trauma is
equally important in dete rmining the stressor's impact and the productio n of PTSD
symptoms as the objective severity of the stressor itself (Tomb, 1994),
The Combat Exposure Scale, which was used in Model 1 to represen t expos ure to
a traumatic event, requires the subject to indicate whethe r they experienced particular
events during the vie tnam War. The scale does not directly assess the subject's reaction
to the events nor docs it d irectly assess their perception of what happened .
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In addition to the issue of perception of traumatic events, Friedman , Schnurr , and
McDonagh..coyle (1994) stale that the type of combat experiencesan individualhas. as
well as thll amount of combat experiencethey have are important risk (acton for PTSD.
Indeed, a number of studies indicate that certain aspec ts of the combat experience are
more directly related to the development of PTSD than others. Being a member or a unit
palmi in Vietnam (Gree n, Grace, Lindy, GIeser, & Leonard, 1990). being exposed 10
grotesqu e and mutilating death (Green, U ndy, Grac e, & GIeser, 19 89), and being
wounded or injured (Friedman et aI•• 1994) are all significant risk factors for the
development of PTSD.
To lake these findings into account, a second mode l, as shown in Figure 3, was
constructed . In this model, factor analysis was used 10 create a latent va riable of trauma
from PTSD diag nosis. a ca tegorical variab le, and C ES score. Thi s rector represents a
reaction to comba t exposure and captures the variance in PTSD accounted for by co mbat
exposure. Thus, an event can be seen as traumatic by some bUI not by others. By
creating such a facto r it is possible to account for situations in which indi viduals high in
comba t exposure are low in PTSD symptoms and individuals low in combat exposure are
high in PTS D symptoms.
In Model 2, a path from the trauma factor to trai l anxie ty is predicted based on the
same justifications for the co mbat exposure 10 trait anx iety path in Model I . A positive
coefficient is predic ted for this path. The other paths in Mode l 2 are identical to those
present ed in Model 1. Model 2 was tested with the data from Sample 1 (N "' 48).
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Mardia' s coefficient, shownin Table 13, indicated an absence of multivariate kurtosis.
All of the beta weightsin this model were assessed as free parameters except for
the factor loading of PTSDdiagnosis onto trauma. The value of this factor loading was
set at 1.0 to establish the scale or the latent variable. Given that PTSD diagnosis was a
categorical variable. with values of either 0 or I , Model 2 was assessed with the EQS
program using polychoric correlation and an arbitrary distribution generalized least
squares (AGLS) methodas per Lee, Poon, & Bentler (1990). The correlation matrix for
the variables in Ihis model is shown in Appendix F.
The indices of goodness of fit for Model2 are shown in Table 13. They included the
Yuan-Bentler corrected AGLSchi-square for the hypothesized mode. This index is a test
of the deviation of the predicted covariance matrix for the variables from the observed
covariance matrix and is derived from the estimated parameters of the model.
Nonsignificant values of the Yuan-Bentler corrected chi square indicate a good overall
fit of the model to the data. Also includedare the AGLSadjusted fit index and the eF t
The adjusled AGl..S fit index is comparable 10an overallmultivariate R2• Its values range
from 0 to I, with values close to 1 suggesting a good fit of the model to the data.
Individual path coefficients were tested for significance by the EQS program and
considered significant if p< .05, two-tailed and [z] > 1.96.
The Modified Model: Results of Pat h Analysis and Testing for Replication in a
Second Sam ple
In terms of overall fit, the model in Figure 3 fits the data from Sample 1 quite well.
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As shown in Table 13 , the indices of overa ll fit were very good. T he hypothesized
model chi-square was "mall and nonsignificant , X'(lO,N=48) = 1.420, p == .99916. The
adj usted AGts fit index was \.00 and the eFt was 1.00 , In comparison to Model I,
these indices sugges t that Model 2 fit the data from Sample I much better . If onc
calc ulates a eFI using Model I as the null model and Model 2 as the lest model, the CFt
equals 1.00, also indicati ng a better tit of Mode l 2 to the data.
The path coefficients between variables are shown in Figure 3. All of the path
coefficients were significan tly diffe rent from zero (p< .05 and [z] > 1.96). The
LaGra nge Multiplier test did not suggest adding any addi tional paths nor did the Wald
test suggest dropping any of the paths in the model.
Hoyle and Panter (1995) note that post-hoc modifications of a model should not be
taken serio usly wit h sample sizes under 800, unless they replicate in an independent
sam ple. Therefo re, Mode l 2 was tested with the data from Sample 2 in order 10 assess
the replicability of the model. The co rrelation matrix for the variables in this model is
show n in Appendix F. Mardia 's coefficient, shown in Tab le 13 (Mode l 2, Sample 2),
indicated that none of the variables exhibited significant multivariate kurtosis.
The resulting indices of fit for Model 2, based on the data from Sample 2, arc shown
in Table 13 . All indices we re very good, indicat ing an adequate fit of the model to the
data from Sample 2. The Yuan-Bentler cor rected AGLS chi-squa re was small and
nonsignifican t (X'(lO,N=25)=9.22, p = .5116 . The adjusted AGLS fit index was .9999
and the CFI was 1.00 .
I I0.77
0.92 !~ 0.72$I Com~1 0.64'0.39:'" /
8 0.69'0.60'/
1.00
It'
C?
0.00 0.60
I I
0.80
, P<.05, Izi ~ 1.96 I
Figure 4. Standardizedsolutionof Model 2, data Crom Sample 2 (N=2S)
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As can beseen from Figure4 , all pathcoefficientsbetweenvariables were significant
(P< .05). The laGrange Multiplier and Wald tests did not indicate adding or dropping
any parameters to improve the fit of Model 2.
The EQS program also allows the simultaneous comparison of a model in two or
more data sampiee. In this type of analysis, the EQS program uses the L.1Grange
Multi plier Test to lest whether significant differences exist between the path coefficients
in the model based on Sample I versus the model based on Sample 2. The LaGrange
Multip lier Test tests the constraint hypothesis that the observed path cocrftclcrusin the
model based on Sample 1 are equal 10 those in the model based on Sample 2.
A Yuan-Bentler correctedchi-squareanda eFI can be calculated for a multigroup
model analysis. These are shown in Table 14, They represent a comparison of a model
based on the model estimates for each o f the respective data sets and the relevant equality
constrain ts with the null model. The Yuan-Bentler corrected chi-square for the present
multig roup model was small and nonsignificant (X' (IG,N= 73) =2 1,092 , p= ,68746 and
the CF I was 1.000 , indicating a very good fit of the model to the two data sets.
Examination of the laGrange Multiplier chi-squares showed that all but two of the
constraints held across the two groups. This reflected the noninvariancc , across the two
samples, of the factor loading of combat onto the trauma factor and the coefficie nt for
the path from trai t to state anxiety,
Altern ate Model 2a
As previously stated, the testing of alternative models is considered an integral part
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of the modeling process (Bollen & Long, 1992; Hull et aI., 1991; Raykov er al. , 1991).
We have thus reviewed the relevant research and created several atrcrnativc models that
may also represent the relationships between anxiety. hos tility I and guilt in PTSD. The
first of these models. Alternate Model za. is shown in Figure 5.
In Alternate Model 2a, a path is predicted from trauma to state anxiety. This path
is predicted from Shalev et al.'s (1996) study on individuals exposed 10 a variety of
civilian traumas. In their study, Shalev et al. (1996) report that, alon e week posttrauma,
subjects who developed PTSD as a result of their exposure to trauma had significantly
higher levels of slate anxiety, but nOI trait anxiety, than subjccts who {lid not develop
PTSD . Subjccts who developed PTSD also had higher levels of stare anxiety at 6 months
posttrauma than subjects who did not develop PTSD . Unfortunately, Sbalev ct at. (1996)
did not assess trait anxiety at 6 months posttrauma. "l11iCl. finding of increased state but
not trait anxiety would suggest that exposure to trauma has a direct influence on state
anxiety . It would not be unreasonable to suggest that experiencing high levels of slate
anxiety over an extended period of time might result in an individual becoming more
anxious in general, i.e having a higher level of trait anxiety. This would account for the
high levels of trait anxiety reported in studies that tested individuals with PTSD many
years after their exposure to a traumatic event (Hoven s et al., 1994; Hovens cr al ., 1992;
Kuhne, et al., 1993; Orr et al., 1995; Sutker, et et., 1991). Thus , a path (rom state 10
trait anxiety is pred icted in Ihis model.
Alternate Model 2a includes the trauma factor. The paths from trait anxiety 10
8'
hostility and hostility to guilt have been left the sameas in thehypothesizedmodel as we
were unable to find any evidence in the current literature 10 suggest alternative
relationships among these variables.
Alternate Model 2a was tested with the data from Sample 1 (N=48) . Mardia's
cocflicient, shown in Table 13 (AM23, Sample 1), indicated the absenceof multivariate
kurtosis.
All of the beta weights in Ihis model wereassessedas free parameters except for the
factor loading of PTSD diagnosis on to trauma which was set at 1.0 . The correlation
matrix for the variables in this modelis shown in Appendix F.
The indices of fit for Alternate Model 2a are shown in Table 13. Individual path
coefficients were tested for signficance by the EQS program and considered
sign ificant if p < .OS(z-test) .
In terms of overall fit, the indices in Table 13 showthat Alternate Model 2a fits the
data from Sample I quite well. The Yuan-Bentler adjusted chi-square was small and
nonsignificant, X1CIO ,N =48)""1.950, p= .99671. The adjustedAGLS fit index was 1.00
and the eFr was 1.0tl These tit indicesare very similar to those obtained with Model
2. A eFI of .07 is obtained when using Model2 as the null model and Alternate Model
2a as the test model. This indicates that, in terms of overal l fit, the two models are
equivalent.
The path coefficicnts betwee n variables are shown in Figure S. All of the path
coefficients were signficantlydifferent (rom zero (p<.05 and lal > 1.96). The LaGrange
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Multiplier test did not suggest adding any additional paths nor did the Waldlest suggcst
drop ping any of the paths in the model.
Alternate Model 2a was also tested with the data from Sample 2 . The correlation
matrix for the variables in this model is shown in Appendix F. Mardia's cocfflccm. as
shown in Table 13 (AM 2a, Sample 2), indicated the absence of multivariate kurtosis.
Table 13 shows the resulting indices of fit for Alternate Model 2a based(In the data
from Sample 2. All indices of fit are quite good, indicating thaI Alternate McxlcI 2a
adequately fits the data from Sample2. The Yuan-Bentleradjusted chi-square was small
and nonsignificant (Xl (lO,N=25)=7.112, p= .6S697. The adjusted AGLSlit index was
0 .999 andIh1. e FI was 0 .999 . A CFI of .3 11 is obtained when using Model 2 as Ihc null
model and Alternate Model 2a as the lest model. This suggests thai the two models flt
the data equally well.
As shown in Figure 6, all path coefficients between variables were significant
(p< .05). The laGrange Multiplier and Wald tea s did not suggest adding or dropping
any parameters to improve the fit or Alternate Mood 23.
A simultaneouscomparison or Alternate Model 2a in Samples 1 and 2 resulted in a
smaIl and nonsignificant Yuan-Bentler correctedchi-square (Xl (10, N=73 ) "" 21.212,
p = .68072) and a eF I or 1.00. These indices are shown in Table 14 and indicate thai
Alternate Model 2a fits the data from both samples very well.
Examination of the LaGrange Multiplier chi-squares showed that all but two of the
constraints held across the two groups. This reflected thenoninvariance, across the two
sa
samples, of the factor loadingof combatonto the trauma factor and the coefficient for
the path fromstate anxiety 10trail anxiety.
Altern/de Model 2b
In Alternate Model zb, as shown in Figure7, a path goes directly from traumato
trait anxiety and a path goes from trauma10stale anxiety. This model suggests that
trauma increasesboth state anxiety and trait anxiety. An immediate increase in stale
anxiety as a result of trauma is predicted from Shalev et el. (1996) as discussedin our
first alternativemodel. AlthoughShale" et al. (1996) did not find elevated levels of trait
anxiety in their subjects at one week posnreuma, high trail anxiety levels have been
consistently found in combat veteranswhohavesuffered from PTSD for almost twenty
years (Havenset aI., 1994; Havens et al., 1992;Orr et al., 1995). Thus. it is possible
that while exposure to trauma has an immediate effect on an individual's level of state
anxiety, its effect on trait anxiety is slowerand thus increases in trait anxiety may not
appearuntil the individual has had PTSD for some time. Indeed, Rolhbaum, Foa, Riggs,
Murdock, andWalsh (1992) haveshownthatthesymptomprofile that is observcdshortly
after the trauma may be quite different from thai observedlater on. This model differs
from Alternate Model 2a in that it suggeststhat the increases in trail anxiety are the
direct result of exposure to trauma and not the result of the increased levels of state
anxiety that occur with exposure to trauma.
As is the case with the first alternative model, the paths between the other variables
are the sameas those predicted in theoriginalhypothesized model.
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Altemate Model 2b was tested with the data from Sample I (N = 48). Mardia ' s
coefficient, shown in Table 13 (AM 2b, Sample I) , indicated tile absence of multivariate
kurtosis.
All of the beta weights in this modelwere assessed as free parametersexcept for the
(actor loading o f PTSD diagnosis on to trauma which was set at 1.0 . The correlation
matrix for the variables in this model is shown in Appendix F.
The indices of fit for Alternate Model 2b are shown in Table 13. Individual path
coefficients were tested for signficance by the EQS program and considered
significan t if p< .OS (z-resi) .
In terms of overall fit, the indices in Table 13 show that Alternate Model 2b fils the
data from Sample I quite well. The Yuan-Bentler adjusted chi-square was small and
nons igni ficant , X1(l O,N= 48)= 1.716, p= .99809 . The adjusted AGLS lit index was 1.00
and the CFI was 1.00. These lit indices are very similar to those obtained with Model
2 . A CFt of .04 is obtained when using Model 2 as the null model and Alternate Model
2b as the test model. Thi s indicates that the two models fit the data equally well.
The path coefficients between variab les are shown in Figure 7. All of the path
coeffic ients were signficantly different from zero (p < ,05 and [zI > 1.96). The LaGrange
Multiplier test did not suggest adding any additional paths nor did the Wald test suggest
dropping any of the paths in the model,
Alternate Model 2b was also tested with the data from Sample 2. The correl ation
9 2
matrix for the variablesin this model is shownin Appendix F. Mardia' s coefficenl, as
shown in Table 13 (AM zb, Sample 2), indicated theabsenceof multivariate kurtosis.
Table 13showsthe resulting indices of fil for Alternate Model 2b basedon the data
from Sample 2. All indices of fit are quite good, indicating thai Alternate Model 2b
adeq uately fits the data from Sample 2. The Yuan-Bentler adjusted chi-square was small
and nonsignificant (XJ (IO,N=25)=7.75 1, p= .67064. The adjusted AGLS fit index was
0.999 and the CFI was 0.999. A CFr of .323 is obtained when using Model 2 as the
null model and AlternateModel 2b as the lest model. This suggeststhat the two models
fit the data from Sample2 equally well.
As shown in Figure 8, all pam coefficients between variables were significant
(p< .OS). The LaGrange Multiplier and Wald tests did not suggest adding of dropping
any parameters to improve the fit of Altemate Model 2b.
A simultaneous comparison of Altemate Model2b in Samples 1 and'l resulted in a
small and nonsignlflcant Yuan-Bentler corrected chi-square (X?(lO,N==73)==21.357,
p == .67256) and a CFt of 1.00. These indicesare shownin Table 14 and indicate that
Alternate Model2b fils the data from both samples verywell.
Examination of the LaGrange Multiplierchi-squaresshowed that all but two of the
constraints held across the two groups. This reflected the noninvariance, across the two
samples, of the factor loading of combat onto the trauma(actor and the coefficient (or
the path from the trauma factor to state anxiety.
'3
Alternate Model ze
Alternate Model 2c combines the information from Model :!and Alternate Modcl2a .
In this model, as shown in Figure 9, a path goes from trauma to stareanxietyand trauma
to trait anxiety. In addition a path goes from trait anxiety 10 state anxiety. Thus, this
model suggests, following the rationales presented with Alternate Model 2a. thai trauma
increases both trait and state anxiety. Increased levels of trait anxiety can then increase
state anxiety, as suggested in Model 2.
As is the casewith theother alternative models, the paths between the other variables
are the same as thosepredicted in theoriginal hypothesizedmodeL
Allemate Model 2c was tested with the data from Sample I (N<,:: 48). Mardia's
coefficient, shown in Table 13 (AM 2c, Sample I), indicated the absence of multivariate
kurtosis.
All of the beta weights in this model were assessed as free parameters except for the
factor loading of PTSD diagnosis on 10 trauma which was set al 1.0. The correlation
matrix for the variables in this model is shown in Appendix F.
The indices of fit for Alternate Model 2c are shown in Table 13. Individual path
coefficients were tested for signficanceby the EQS program and considered significant
ifp< .05 (z-test).
In terms of overall fit, the indices inTable 13 show that Alternate Model 2c fits the
data from Sample 1 quite well. The Yuan-Bentleradjustedchi-square was small and
nonsignificant, }{1(9,N'=48)==1.350, p,=.99811. The adjusted AGLS fil indexwas 1.00
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and the CFI was 1.00 . These fit indices are very similar to those obtained with
Model 2. A CFI of .04 is obtainedwhen using Model2 as thenull model and Alternate
Model 2c as the lest model. This indicates that the two mode ls fit the data equa lly well.
The path coe fficients between varia bles arc shown in Figure 9. All of the path
coefficients were signficanUydifferent from zero (p< .05) except for the path from
trau ma to stale anxiety and the path from trait anxiety to slate anxie ty. As, for the
purposes of the present study, significant path coefficients are an estimate of the
goodness of fit of the model,Allemate Model 2c was consideredto be an inappropriate
modelof the relationships amongIhe relevant variablesand was not tested in Sample 2.
Alterna te Model 2d
Alternate Mod el 2d combines the in for mation presented in Alternate Mode l 2a and
Alternate Model 2b. In this model, a path goes from trauma to state anxiety and a path
goes from trauma to trait anxiety. In addi tion, a path runs from state to trai t. This model
suggests that exposu re to trauma increases trait and state anx iety. It also suggests that
increased levels of state anxiety contrib ute to the increase in trait anxiety . This is
consis tent with the research by Shalev er aI. (1996) presented in Alte rnate Model 2a.
As is the case with the other alternativ e models, the paths between the other variables
are the sameas those predicted in the original hypothesized model.
Alternate Model 2d was tested with the data from Sa mple I (N =48 ). Mardia' s
coe fficie nt, show n in Table 13 (AM 2d, Sample I), indicated the absenc e of multivariate
kurto sis.
9.
All of the bela weights in this model were assessedas free parametersexcept for the
factor loading of PTSD diagnosis on 10 trau ma which was set at 1.0. T he corre lation
matrix for the variablesin this model is shown in Appendix F.
Th e indices of fi t for Alternate Model 2d are shown in Table 13. Individual path
coefficients were tested for signficanceby the F.QS program and considered significant
if p< .05 (z-tCSI).
In terms of overall fit, the indices in Table 13 show that Alternate Model 2d fits the
data from Sample 1 quite well. The Yuan-Bentler adjusted chi-square was small and
nonsignificant, X'(9,N=48)= 1.350, p= .99811. The adjusted AGLSfit index was1.00
and the CFt was 1.00. These fit indices are very similar to those obtained with Model
2. A CFI of .04 is obtained when using Model 2 as the null model and Allemate Model
2d as the test model. This indicates that, in terms of overall fit, the two models are
equivalent.
The path coefficients between variables are shown in Figure 10. All of the path
cocfficients were signficantly different from zero (p<.05) except for the path from
trauma to trait anxiety and the path from stare anxiety to trait anxiety. As, for the
purposes of the present study. significant path coefficients are an estimate of the
goodness of fit of the model. AlternateModel 2d was considered to be an inappropriate
model of the relationships amongthe relevant variables and was not tested in Sample 2.
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Construc tion of Model 3: The Relationship of Startle To Anxiety in PTSD.
As an exagge rated startle response is a frequent symptom of PTSD in veterans
(Keane , 1993). path analysis was used to examine the relationship between trauma,
anx iety, hostil ity, and startle. The path diagram for this second hypothesized model is
shown in Figure I I .
Model 3 is quite similarto Model 2 shown in figures 3 and4 withtwo exceptions.
First, a path from Slate anxiety to EMG response averagehasbeen added. In humans,
the acoustic startle reflex is measuredas the magnitudeof theeyeblinklEMG response
com ponent of the reflex (Morgan et aI. ,199.5) . Thus, in Model 3, startle response is
represented by the average, across fifteen trials, of a subject's EMG responseto a loud
lone. The path from stateanxiety to startle, EMG response,is predicted on the basis of
a number of recent researchfindingswhich suggest that the exaggeratedstartle response
observed in many patients wiih PTSD is analogous to the fear-potentiated startle
response seen in rodents. Fear-potentiated startle in rodentsoccurs when the amplitude
of the startle response is increasedby the startle stimulus beingpresentedin the presence
of a cue, such as a light, that haspreviouslybeen pairedwith a shock. It is believed that
fear-potentiated startle is producedby the associative conditioning of a central fear state
(Cook et at , 1991).
In humans, it has also been shown that fear "potentiates" thestartle response. Cook
et al, (1991), report that stante responses were enhanced in high fear healthy human
subjects in comparison to low fear subjects. Fear was manipulated in the subjects by
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having them view negative andpositive imagery . Grillan et al . (1993) assessed the role
of individual differences in state and trait anxiety on baseline and fear po tentiated
stan lcin normal subj ects. Theyfound that base line start le did not differ between h igh and
low anxiety subjects but II:e magnitude of fear -potentiated startle wassignificantly larger
in high anxiety subjects than low anxiety subjects. Trait amdety d id not accoun t for
individual differences in either baseline or rear-poten tiated start le.
Morg an et al . (1995) have loo ked at the startle response and its relationship to trait
and state anxiety in Vietnamveterans with PTSD. They report thal veterans with PTSD
had higher state an xiety scores and larger sta rtle respon ses at baseline and during threat
of a shock than age-matched, healthy controls. Morgan et at (1995) suggest that the
eleva ted levels o f baseline startle found in their subjects with PTS D result from a greate r
condit ioned emoti onal response in this grou p . triggered by the anticipation of shock .
genera lizing to the unfamiliar context in whic h the testing took place. Thus , the increased
levels of startle are not the result of a chronic eleva tion of start le but rather are a result
of the increased levels o f stale anxiet y experienced by the subjects with PTSD •
Morgan, Grillo n, Southwick, Davis, & Charney (199 6) have also found sig nificantly
higher levels of acoustic startle response in Gulf War ve terans with PTSD when
com pared to Gulf Wat ve terans without PTSD and civ ilian co ntrols. They state that the
exaggerated start le responses seen in these vete rans wi th PTSD may be the resu lt of the
experimental situation in whi ch the subjects are tested prod ucing higher levels of anxiety
in the subjects with PTSD . Morgan et al. (1996) sugges t that thi s increase in anxie ty then
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elevates startle magnitude in the PTSD subjects.
Basedon the above findings, a path is predicted in Model 3 fromstate anxiety to
startle, as represented by EMG response . This path suppo rts the idea that increases in
the magnitude of the startle response are the result of elevated levels of sta le anxiety ,
i.e.• a fear-potentiated startle response. A positive coefficie nt is pr edicted for the pa th
from state anxiety to EMG response.
Model 3 retains the trauma factor from Model 2 as well as the palh from it to trait
anxiety. It also keeps the path fromtrait to stateanxiety and trail anxiety to hostility.
Howev er, the path from hostility to guilt has been dropped in Mod el 3. Th is palhwa s
dropped due to the fact that retainingit in thenew model would rcsuh in the new model
having too many parameters for analytic purposes.
Model 3: Method and G oodness of Fit Indices
Model 3 was tested with the data Irom Sample 2 (N=2 5), Unfortunately,
physiologicalvariables were unavailable {or Sample I, and it wasnot possible toassess
the fit of Model 3 10that datasample, Mardia's coe fficient, shown in Table 13 (Model
3, Sample I), indicated the absenceof multivariate kurtosis .
As with Model 2, all of the beta weights in Model 3 wer e assessed as Free
parameters except forthe factor loading o f PTSDdiagnosis omo trauma, which wasset
at 1.0 . Given thai PTSD diagnosis wasa categorical variable, with valuesof ei ther a o r
1, Model 3 was assessed with the EQS program using an arbitrary d istribution
general izedleast squares (AGLS) method. Thecorre lationmat rix for the variablesin Ihis
'02
model is shown in A ppendix F.
Theindicesofgoodnessof fitfor Model 3 are shown inTable 13. They included the
AGLS chi-squarefor the hypothesized model, the AGLSadjusted fit index andthe CFI.
Individ ual path coefficientswere tested for significanceby the EQS programand
considereds ignificant ifp< .05, two-tailedand Izl 1.9 6.
Model 3: Res ults of Path An alysis
In terms of overal l fit, Model 3, shown in Figure II , fils th e data from Samp le 2
qui te well, As shown in Table 13, the indices of overall fit were very good . The Yuan-
Bentler adj usted c hi-square was small and nonsignificant, X1(IO,N=25)==7.1~,
p= .70712. Theadjustcd AGLS lil index was .999 and the CFI was 1.00.
The path coefficients between variables are shown in Figure 11. All of the path
coefficients were significantly different from zero (P < ,OS and [z»1.96). The
laGrange M ultiplier test did nol suggest adding any additional paths nor did the Wald
test suggest d ropping any of the paths ill the model.
Alternate M odel 3a
Given that twoequivalent models were found for M odel 2, it was decided to test
similar models with Model 3.
Alternate Model 3a, as show n in Fig ure 12, incorporates the paths from Alternate
Model 2a. Thus , there is a path from trauma to stale anxiety and a path from state
anx iety 10trait anxiety. Allother pathsare thesame as in Model 3 , shownin Figure I I.
Alternate Model 3a wastes ted with the data from Sampl~2{N-2S) . As wasthe case
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with Model 3, it was not po ssible to assess the fit of Alternat e Model 3a in Sample 1.
Mardia 's coefficient, show n in Table 13 (AM 31'1, Sample I), indicated the ab sence of
multivariatekurtosis,
As with Mode l 3, the beta weig hts in Alternate Model 31'1 were assessed as free
parameters except for the factor loading of PTSD diagnosis onto trauma, which was SCi
at 1.0. Giventhat PTSDdiagnosis wasa categorical variable, withvaluesof either0 or
1, Alternate Model 3a was assessedwith the EQSprog ramusing anarbitrarydist ribution
ge neralized least squa res (AGLS) met hod. The correlation mat ri x {or the variables in this
model is shown in Appendix F.
The indices of goodness of fit for Altern ate Mode l 3a are shown in Table 13. They
includedthe Yuan-Bender corrected AGLS chi-square for the hypothesized model, the
AGLSadjusted fit indexand the CFl,
Individualpath coefficients we re tested for significance by the EQS program and
considered significant jf p < .05, two-tailed and[z]> 1.96.
In terms of overall fit , Alternate Model 3a, shown in Fig ure 12, fits the data from
Sample2 quite well . As shown in Table 13, the indices or o ver all lit were ve ry good.
The Yuan- Bentler adjusted ch i-square was small and nonsignificant, X' (10,
N :::25)== 7.712, p==.65697 . The adjusted AGLS fit index was .999 and the CFI was
1.00. A relative CFI of .164 was calculated using Model 3 as the null model and
Alternate Model3 a as the hypothesizedmodel.Thisindicates that Model 3and Alternate
Model 3a fitthe data from Sample 2 equaly well.
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Th e path coefficients betw een varia bles are shown in Figure 12. All of the path
coefficients were significantly different from zero (p < .05 and [2J> 1.96). The
laGran ge Multiplier test did not suggest adding any additional pa ths nor did the Wald
test s uggest drop ping an y of the paths in the model.
Alternate Model 3b
Alternate Mode13b, as shown inFigure 13, was constructedfoll owing the rationales
used to build Alternate Model 2b . In this model, a path goes from trauma \0 stale anxiety
and a path goes from trauma to traitanxiety. All other paths are the same as those in
Model 3.
A lternate Model 3b was tested with the data from Sam ple 2 (N =25). Once again,
it wa s not possible to assess the fit of Alternate Model 3b in Sample 1. Mardla's
coeffic ient,shown in Table 13 (AM 3b, Sample I) , indicated the absen ce of multivariate
kurtos is.
A s withModel 3, al l of the b eta weights in A' ternete Model 3b were assessed as frcc
parame tersexcept for the factor loading of PTSD diagnosis onto trauma, which was set
at 1.0. Given thai PTSD diagnosis was a categorical variable, with va lues of citherO or
1, Alte rnate M odel 3b was assessed with the EQS program using an arb itrary di stribution
generali zedleas t squares (AGLS) method . Thecorrelation matrix for the variables in this
mode l is shown in Appendix F .
The indices of goodness of fit for AlternateModel 3b arc shown in Table 13.They
included the Yuan-Bentler correc ted A.GLS chi-squarefor the hypothesized model, the
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AGLS adjusted fit index and the CFI.
Indi vidual path coefficients were tested for significance by the EQS program and
considered significant if p<.05, two-tailed and [z] > 1.96.
In terms of overall fit, Alternate Model Sb, shown in Figure 13, fit the data from
Sample 2 relatively well. As shown in Table 13, the indices of overall lil were
acceptable . The Yuan-Bentler adjusted chi-square was small a nd nonsignificant.
XI(IO,N:::25):::lO.098, p=.43194. The adjusted AGLS iii index was .998 and the CF I
was l. 00. However, a relative CFI of 1.00 was calculated using Al ternate Model 3b as
the null model and Model 3 as the hypothesized model. This indicates that Model 3 fils
thedata fromSample2 muchbetter than AlternateModel3b. Inaddition, a relativeCPI
of 1.00 wascalculated usingAlternate Mode1 3b as thenull model and AlternateModel
3a as the hypothesized Model. This suggests that Alternate Model 3a also fits the data
from Sample 2 much better than Altcrnate Model 3b.
The path coefficients between variables are shown in Figure 13. All of the path
coefficients were significantly different from zero (p< .05 and [z» 1.96). The
laGrange Multiplier test did no t suggest adding any additional pat hs nor did the Wald
test suggest dropping any of the paths in the model.
Summary
A comparison of the overall fit indices and significance cf'paramctcrs indicated that
Mode l 2, Alternate Model 2a, an d Alternate Model 2b fit the datafrom the two samples
equally well.
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Model 3 and Alternate Model 3awere found to beessentially equi valent in termsor
fit and significance of parameter s when applied 10 the data from Sa mple 2. Allemate
Model 3b did not fit the data from Sample 2 aswell aseither of these models.
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Discussion
Overview of find ings
PTSD is thoughtto be a common disorder, affectingindividualso f all ages and
cultures. While PTSD is an exception 10other psychiatric disorders in thai its Initial
cause is known, the nature of the symptoms that constitute this disorder remains to be
firm lyestablishedin order that moreeffective meansof treatmentcan be developed.
The present study is. 10 the best of our knowlcdege, the first atrcrnptto use path
analysis to lest for possible interrelationships between the symptoms of anxiety,
hostility, guilt , and startle within PTSD. Our hypothesizedmodel, as shown in F igure
3 . fits the data from two separate samples of Vietnam veterans very well both
in terms of overall fit and the significance of the individual parameters. This
suggests thai the model may becapturing the relationships and directions of influence
be tween anxiety, hostility, and guilt for these individuals with PTSD. As 11'0'0 of the
four alternative models we tested lit the data from both samples just as well as our
hypothesized model, it is equally likely that they reflect possible relation ships among
the variables.
Our hypothesized model of the rel ationship between startle and anxlcty in p'rSD
fit the data very well. Unfortunately, we did not have a second data sample with
which to test the replicability of this model. As was the case with the anxiety,
hostility , guilt model, we found an alternative model for the start le mode l that fit the
data from ou r sample equally well.
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The presentstudy alsoshows that veteranswith and without PTSDcan beaccurately
classifiedon the basis of their scoreson the Buss Durkee suspicious hostility subscale and
that our two samples of veterans differ from each other in terms of how they
express hostility.
Popu lal ion nlrrerences In Style of Express ing lI ostilily
The analyses conducted 10 determine how best to represent hostility in our path
models produced several findings of empirical interest.
The resultsof thediscriminant analysesindicate that, in the presentstudy, Vietnam
Combat veterans with PTSDcan bebestdistinguished from veterans withoutPTSD on
the basis of their scores on the suspicious hostility subscale. This finding suggests that
suspicious hostility is an important aspect of the elevated hostility levels of the veterans
v,'ilh PTSD. It is quite probable that the increases in trail anxiety associated with PTSD
create an individual who constantly feels threatened. As a result these individuals may
be very suspicious in nature and react 10 unknown people or situations with hostility as
a means of defence.
While suspicious hostility is a significantdiscriminating variable. the resultsof the
covariance analyses suggesr that suspicious hostility on its own does nol capture all
aspects of hostility experienced by combat veterans with PTSD. Covarying suspicious
hostility out of the total hostility score and the subscale scores does not eliminate
significant group differences on all these measures. Moreover, there is no consistent
pattern between the two samples with regard to which variables are affected by the
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covariance analysis and which are not. Thus, the veterans in our two samples express
hostil ity differently. Th is is consistent wiih previo us research . Innon· PTSD populations,
expression of hostility measuredwith theBuss Durkeehostility subscalcs hasbeen found
10 differ in Native versus non-Native Americans (Young, 1992), anabolic steroid users
versus non-users (Yates, Perry, & Murray, 1992), assaultive versus suicide attcmptillg
males (Maiuro , O'Su llivan, Michael, & Vitaliano , 1989), suicide attem pting versus
nonviolent males (Maiuro et al., 1989) and assaultive versus nonviolent males (Maiuro
et al. , 1989).
The results of the discriminant analyse s and the analyses of cova riance do suggest
however, that when using the Buss Durkee Hostility Inventory, researchers should pay
close attention to differenceson the individual subscales as well as on the Hostility
Inventory total score. With respect to the present study, it would be interesting to sec
whether the suspicious subscaleis a significant discriminating variable in other samples
of Vietnam combat veterans. If it did tum out to be such a variable, it would suggest that
suspicion is indeeda significantproblem for this population of PTSDsufferers and while
it may not account for all aspectsof their hostility, treating suspicion may help alleviate
some of their hostile feelings. It would also be worthwhile investigating whether
suspicious hostility is a significant discriminating variable for individuals from
populations other than male combat veterans, such as female assault victims, victims of
natural disasters, or sexually and/or physicaly abused children with and without PTSD.
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Path Analysis : The Role of Interventng Variables in th e Pathogen esis of PTSD
Bollen and Long (1992) stale that the best guide to assessing the fit of a model is
strong substantiative theory. Followingthis maximour first model, shownin Figure 2,
should fit the data very well and the overall fit indices indicate that it does. However,
in constructing this model we have failed 10 take into account one important aspect of
PTSD; that not every individual exposedto a traumatic event, such as military combat,
will go on 10 develop Pl'SD . Thus, it is not surprising that in applying Model 1 to the
data fromSample I, we find that the path fromcombat exposure 10 trait anxiety is not
statistically significant.
Tomb(1994)states that the stressor an individualis exposedto is the most important
risk factor in the development of PTSD. According to Tomb (1994) a stressor is more
likely 10result in PTSD ifit is ~ .. severe, sudden, unexpected, prolonged, repetitive, or
intentional; does physical damage to oneself or a loved one; is life-threatening; is
isolating: conflicts with one's sense of self; is physically or psychologlcatly demeaning;
or does damage to one' s community or support systems" (Tomb, 1994). Participation in
combat can be considered to possess all of these characteristics. Indeed research has
found that specific combat experiences that involve threat to one' s life or the life of a
friend or are considered to represent intense and severe combat exposure result in a
greeter likelihood of an individual developing PTSD (Davidson & Fairbank, 1993; Green
et al., 1990; Foy et at , 1984; Fa y, Carroll, & Donahue, 1987; Fried man et al., 1994;
Schlenger, Kulka, Fairbank, Hough, Jordan, Marmar, & Weiss, 1992).
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However, a number of the above stressor characteristicspurportedto increase the
risk of PTSD are very subjective in nature and thus depend largely upon how an
individual perceives a situation. Reich (1990) stales that the meaning an individual
attributes to a traumatic event mustbe involvedin the developmentof PTSD. DSM·IV
(1994) has also recognizedthis fact and emphasizes that an individual's perceptionof and
reaction to a stressoris equally important in thedevelopment of PTSDas the objective
severityof the stressor. This implies thatan event consideredtraumatic by one individual
may not beconsideredtraumatic by another. 111ischange in thedefinitionof a stressor
in DSM·IV (1994) helps to explain why only a portion of individuals exposed 10 a
traumatic event will develop PTSD.
How an individual perceives a traumatic event is most likely the result of their
personality and their experiences prior to the event. Schlengeret al. (I992), in a study
that examined the prevalence of PTSD in Vietnam combat veterans, report that the
characteristics individuals bring with them to combat have a significant role in
determining who develops PTSDwhen exposedto high levelsof combatstress. Examples
of pretrauma experiences that mayincreasean individual' s riskof developing PTSDupon
exposure to a traumatic event include negative childhood experiences such as parental
poverty, parental.separation, and abuse (Davidson, Hughes, Blazer, & George, 1991);
low intelligence, poor education,limitedcopingabilities, youth, and low socioeconomic
status (fomb , 1994).
Pretrauma experiences are not the only factors that may be- relevant to the
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pathogenesisof PTSD. Reich (1990) pointsout, that personalityvariables mustalso be
involvedin the developmentof YfSD as it is unlikely that personality would not playa
part in the subjective meaning an individual attributes to an event. In fact there is
research that suggests that certain personality styles may predispose an individual to
P'TSD.Neuroticismand introversionare two examples(McFarlane, 1989). In addition,
personality disorders such as childhoodconductdisorder may also increase the risk of
developingPTSD (Helzer, Robins, & McEvoy, 1987).
Given the high comorbidity of other psychiatricdisorders with PTSD (Davidsonet
aI., 1991; Keane & Wolfe. 1990), it has been suggested thai a personal history of
psychiatric illness may predispose an individualto develop PTSD (DSM-IlI-R, 1987;
Friedman, 1989). HoweverI while two studieshave linkedprevious mental illnessto an
increased risk of developingPTSD (Greenet al., 1990; McFarlane, 1989), othershave
found it 10 be unrelated to PTSD (Friedman, 1989). In this regard, Keane and Wolfe
(1990) have cautioned inferring any causaldirection to the relationship between PTSD
and other disorders.
It is Interesting to notehowever, thata numberof studiesreport that a familyhistory
of psychiatric illness may be a risk factor (or PTSD (Davidson, Swartz, Storck,
Krishnan, &. Hammett, 1985; Davidsonet al., 1991; Foy et al., 1987; Kulka et aI••
1990). In their study, Foy et al. (1981) report that high levels of combat were a
significant risk factor for PTSD regardlessof whetheran individual had a family history
of psychiatricillness. However, veteranswho wereexposedto low levelsof combat, but
lIS
who had a family history of psychiatricillness, were more at risk of developingPTSO
than individuals exposed to similar levels of combat but who did not report having a
historyof psychiatricillness in their family. Thesefindings suggest that there may bea
genetic component thatpredisposes peopleto PTSD.True et al. (1993) report, in a twin
study on PTSD, that even after adjusting for differences in combat exposure, genetic
factorsaccount for a significant portionof thevariancein PTSDsymptom liability. The
conceptofa genetic predisposition 10developPTSD is consistentwith Adamec's (1980)
observation that very early in life cats differ in terms of their defensive response with
some cats exhibiting much moredefensivebehavior in responseto a threat than others.
Adamec (1991) suggests that some animals may be born with a predisposition to respond
defensively to threatening stimuli. The same may be true of humans (Kagan & Snidman,
1991).
In addition to pretrauma risk factors there are also a number of posttrauma risk
factors. PTSD has been associated with lack of post-trauma social support (Davidson cr
al., 1991; Green et al., 1990) and impaired social functioning (Davidson et at., 1991;
Stretch., 1985).
The rationale for the path from combat exposure to trait anxiety in Model I is
justified given that there is substantial research to suggest that intense trauma alters the
neural substrate for fear/anxiety. However, given the information presented above, it is
highly unlikely that a direct path exists between a traumatic event, such as combat
exposure, and anxiety. An individual's reaction to the trauma determines the
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severity/intensity of the trauma. Our modified model, which is discussed in the next
section, lakes this (act into account.
While the present study does not examine individual risk (actors for PTSD. future
tcsting of PTSD models which include some of these risk factors is a val id exerc ise for
researche rs interested in preventing PTSD . Identifying individuals who are predisposed
to developPTSD as a result of exposure to trauma, whether mild or severe, can result
in these individuals rece iving immediate interventio n, in the form of cou nselling or
medication, that may help preventthe development of this disorder.
Model 2: A Possible Represent ati on of th e Relationships Bet ween Anx iet y, H ostility ,
and Guilt Within PTSD
As previously discussed, for anygiven situation, the natureof a traumatic stressor
will only account for a portion of the variabilityof whichindividualsdevelop P'fSD. An
individual's reaction 10 the situation, which is determinedby aspects of their personality
and their previous experiences,is also a determining factor.
To takethe aboveinto account, the initialmodel, Model I, was modified 10 include
a latent variable called trauma which represents an individual's reaction to combat as a
traumaticexperience.The trauma factor in Model 2, as shown in Figure 3, captures the
variability in PTSD diagnosis that is accounted for by combat exposure. Thus, it is
pulling out those aspects of combat that are most related to the development of P'fSD.
The trauma factor incorporates the idea that an individual's perception of their combat
experience as traumaticis equally, if not more, importantthan anyobjective measure of
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the severity of their combat exposure.
As shown in Table 13. the overall fit of Model 2 to the data from Sample I is very
good . In addition, all path coeflicientsbetween the variables in Model 2 are significan t.
Thi s suggests thai Model 2, as a whole, may be ca pturing some aspects of what is
occurring between trauma, anxiety, hostility. and guilt within PT$D. This .is supported
by the fact that the good overall fit indices and significant paths obtained for Model 2
with thedata fromSample I replicate whenthe model is applied 10 the data fromSample
2.
In Medel 2. the path from the traumafactor to trail anxiety is statistically significant
when the model is tested on both samples of veterans. The fact that this path is
significant and the palh from combat exposure directly to trait anxiety in Model I is
nonsignificant supports the idea. a.s suggested above, Ihat the perccption of combat as
traumatic is perhaps more important to thedevelopment of PTSD than the objectively
measured intensity of an individual's combat exposure. Thus, Model 2. suggests that
when an individual perceives an event as traumaticand reacts 10it as such. they become
inherently more anxious. Such a concept is consistent with Adamec's (1978) emotive
biasing model concept which has been applied to epileptic anxiety and PTSD (Adamec,
1996; Pitman et at., 1993). According to Adamec, scnsinzatlon of neural structures
which process threatening stimuli can alter connections between these neural structures
and others involved in the expression of fearfanxiety, ultimately producinga long lasting
increase in the fear/anxiety expressedin response to future threatening situations.
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While the laGrange Multiplier Test indicates that the path coefficient from the
trauma factor 10 trait anxiety is significant and equal in the two sa~ples , it also shows
that the factor loadingof combat onto the trauma factor is noninvariantacross the two
samples. In Sample 2, the factor loading for combat onto trauma is positive while in
Sample I the factor loading is negative. The difference in the factor loading of combat
onto trauma is readilyaccounted for within the definition of a traumatic stressor as per
DSM·IV (1994). As previously discussed. an individual's perception of an event as
stressful or threateningplays a large role in determiningits impact. Therefore, it would
beexpectedthat the loading of combat exposureontotrauma might vary between samples
given that combat experiences are interpreted on an individual basis. Thus, in some
populations, individualswith low combat exposure may nevertheless be highly reactive
and develop PTSD.The oppositeof this maybe true in other populations. This mayhave
occurred in the two samples studied. In Sample 1, the veterans with PTSD reported
lower combat exposure scores than non-PTSD veterans, whereas the opposite was the
case in Sample2.
The path from trait to state anxiety is significant when Model 2 is applied to bothof
the data sets. Such a finding is not surprising in that it is only reasonable to expect that
individualshigh in traitanxiety or anxiety-proneness will exhibit elevatedlevels of state
anxietyin situationsthey perceive as threatening(Barker, Wadsworth, & Wilson, 1976).
However, the LaGrange Multiplier Test indicates that the coeffcient for the path from
trait to state anxiety differs across the two data samples. The coefficient for the path
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from trait to state anxiety in Sample I is much larger than the coefficient for the same
path in Sample 2. This noninvariance of the palh coefficient from trail to slate anxiecy
maybe the result of dilferences in the levels of stale anxiety reported by subjectsin the
two samples at the time of testin&. Subjects with PTSD in Sample 2 had significantly
higher scores on the stale component of the STAI than subjects with PTSD in Sample I
(f(l ,3?) ""16.37 , p < .(01). Control subjects in Sample 2 also had significMlly higher
state anxiety scores than the control subjects in Sample I (F(I ,J7)= 3j .12, p < . ססOO 1 ).
Of part icular relevance is the finding thai control subjec ts in Sample 2 did not dif fer
significantly in state anxiety from PTSD subjects in Sample I (P(I,32)= .62. p> .05).
Thus. control subjects in sample 2 were experiencing levels of state anxiety at the time
of testing that were comparable to those experiencedby subjccts with PTSD in Sample
1. The higher levels of state ;,;,nxiety in Sample 2 subjects may be the resultof their Slate
anxiety being measured immediately prior to their participating in a labor.uory
experiment designed 10 assess their startle response. Uncertainly or even knowledge
regarding !he nature or this lesting could result in !he subjects in Sample2 clIpcriencing
increased levels or anxiety at the lime of completing the Slatecomporenl of the STAI.
Subjects in Sample 1 were not tested under such conditions.
Thus, a possible explanation for the noninvariance in the coefficient for the trait to
stale anxiety path is that the conditions under which subjects in Sample 2 were tested
produced a larger increase in slate anxiety in the controls than in the subjects with PTSD
in Sample 2. PTSD subjects may not have increased as much as controls becausethey
12 0
were near their maximum anxiety level in a basal state. This interpretation is supported
by the finding that ,'I" mean difference in state anxiety between control subjects in
Sample I and Sanl!,l . '2was 28.53 compared to a mean difference of 19.85 between
PTSD subjects in the two samples. In addition, the meandifference between state anxiety
scores for PTSD subjects versus controls in Sample 1 was 29.96 compared I.:> a mean
difference of 21.27 (or control and PTSD subjects in Sample 2. Given that the two
samples did not differ in terms of trait anxiety, I.e. neither sample was more anxious
thantheother in general, one wouldexpecta lower value of the slope of the relationship
between trait and slate anxiety in the subjects from Sample 2. As a path coefficient is an
index.of this slope, the path coefficient between trait and slate anxiety would be smaller
in Sample 2 than in Sample I, hence the noninvariance of this path coefficient across the
two samples. This is consistent with Martin et al. (1987) who Slate that correlations
between slate anxiety and trait anxiety, as measured by the STAI, are lower when
subjects are placed in threatening situations,
A particularly relevant finding in Model 2, is the significanceof the path from trait
anxiety to hostility which replicates in the second da'a sample and is invariant across the
two samples. Model 2 supports the idea that, in our samples. high levels of anxiety lead
to increased hostility. This is consistent with Hovenset aI. 's (1992) suggestion that the
high correlation betweenanger and trait anxiety in their sample of veterans with PTSD
is the result of uncontrollable anxiety making one angry and Dutton's (1995) suggestion
that, in abusive men with a PTSD·Jj1ce condition, hostililylaggression serves to reduce
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anxiety. Model 2 may also explain why previous studies have also found a relationship
betwee n hostility and trail anxiety in subjects other than veterans with PTSD
(Deffenbach er et aI., 1986; Katz et al., 1993). Anxiety may be a natural precursor of
hostility for some individuals regardless of the initial cause of the anxiety .
Thus, as previously suggested by Lasko et al. (1994) , it is highly unlikely that the
increased levels of hostility observed in combat veterans with PTSD arc the result o f
combat exposu re per se. Rather, it appears that hostility is related to the increased levels
of anxiety experienced by these individuals as a result of a traumatic stresso r.
Model 2 also suggests that the veterans in our two samples experience considerable
gui lt in relation to their increased hostility. This would beexpected in (hat their hostility
is most likely a spontaneous, protective response to uncontro llable feelings ofanxlcty that
are generated by any situation the individual perceives as threatening. Van der Kolk
(1987) states that individuals with PTSD often go from stimulus to response without
making a psycbcloglcal assessment of the situation. Thus , an individual with IYrSD rna)'
misinterpret an event as threatening, experience hcightened levels of anxiety in response
to the threat, and become hostile as a means of protecting themselves from the perceived
threat. Later on, the individual may realize that their reaction was not warranted by the
situation and they feel considerable guilt for their actions. It would also not be surprising
if these feelings of gu ill might cause further anxiety, in that the individua l is able to
realize that they are frequently making inappropriate responses to situations but they are
unable to control these responses. This may account for the number of veterans with
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PTSD who self-medicate with drugs and alcohol in an attempt to gain some control over
thei r anxiety and heightened hostility (Fried man, 1991).
Alter native Models of the Relationship Between Anxiety, lIosli lily, and Guilt In
I'TS D
An examination of Table 13 shows that two of the alternative models we tested fit
the data from our two samples of Vietnam veterans with PTSD as well as Model 2, our
hypothesized model. This suggests thai the palhs between the variabl es in these models
rep resent plausible alternative relationships between anxiety, hostility, and guilt .
(i) Alternate Model 2a
In Alternate Model2a the path from the trauma factor10staleanxiety is significant
and invariant in both of our samples. This suggests that, for individuals who develop
PTSD, exposure toa traumaticeventsuch as combat may produce increases in their level
of state anxiety i.e. how they react 10 situations they perceive as threaten ing. Thi s is
consistent with Shalev et al. ' s (1996) finding of increased state anxiety at 1 week
posurauma and 6 months posttrauma in individuals who develop PTSD when compared
to individuals who do not develop PTSD.
The path from state anxiety to trait anxiety is also significant in both of the samples.
Th is suggests that individuals with PTSD who experience increased state anxiety to
threatening situations may ultimately become more anxious in general, i.e . , have higher
levels of trait anxiety. This would accou nt for Shalev et al.'s (1996) finding of no
increase in trail anxiety at I week posttra uma in individuals who go on to develop PrSD
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and theconsistent finding of increased trail anl-icey in individuals with PTSD who arc
being testedmany years after the nrigjnal traumatieevent. The mechanism through which
state anxiety may increasetrait anxietymightbe similar 10 kindling. Van der Kolk(l981)
stales that individuals with PTSD respond 10 emotional stimulation with an intensity
appropriate 10 the original trauma.Van der Kolk (1987) also suggests thai repealed
traumatization may produce a kindling phenomenon which may result in behavioral
(characterological) changes. Thus, it is possible lhal individuals who respond to
subsequent stressors with the same level of state anxiety as they did with the original
trauma may,lh rougha mechanismsimilar 10 kindling, bccomc pcrmancnUy more anxious
i.e have a higher level of trait anxiety than they did prior 10 the trauma.
The results of Alternate Model 2a have an inleoesting implication for the role of
hostility in PTSD. If , as the modelsuggests, trail anxiety is a delayed symptom in P'TSD
then one would not expect 10observe increased levels of hostilily in individuals with
PTSD until the disorder has progressed. It would be of interest 10 determine whether
increased hostility is observed in individuals at the lime of the trauma or sometime after.
Moreover, increasedhostilily should followor be coincident with increased trait anxiety.
It should be noted that the path from stare to trait anxiety varied across the IwO
samples. This can be accounted for by differences in the conditions under which stale
anxiety was assessed in the two samples as discussed in the previous section on Model
2.
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(ii) Alternat e Model 2b
In Alternate Model 2b the paths fro.:l the trauma factor to state anxiety and the
trauma factor to trait anxiety are significant in both samples. The noninvariance of the
path from trauma to stale anxiety across the two samples can be accounted for by the
sample differences in the levels of state anxiety that result from the conditions under
which state an xiety was assessed in the two samples.
The findingora significantpath from thetrauma factor to stale anxietyand from the
trauma factor to trait an xiety suggests that trauma has a direct impact on state anxiety and
a direct impact on trait anxiety. These findings are consistent with Shale v et aJ. ' s ( 1996)
findings on stale anxiety and PTSD and all the studies that have found increased levels
of trail anxiet y in indi viduals with PTSD (Haven s et aI•• 1994; Ha vens et aI. , 1992 ;
Kuhne et al. , 1993; Orret al., 1995; Sutker et al. , 1991). This model suggests that while
trauma has an immediate impact on state anxiety, its e ffect on trait anxiety may be
dela yed. Thi s is consistent with Rothbaum et at (1992) who report that the symptoms
observed in individuals who develop PTSD shortly after the trauma are differen t than the
symptoms observed later on. This model also implies that the effects of trauma on state
anxie ty and trait anxiety are not interdependent.
A phenomenon that may be related to the increases in anxiety observed in individuals
with PTSD is dissociation. Several studies have reported that individuals who experience
dissociation at the time of the trauma are more likely 10develop PTSD than individual s
who do not experience dissociation (Bremner, Southwick, Brett, Fontana, Rosenheck, &
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Charney, 1992; Marmar. Weiss, Schlenger, Fairbank, Jordan, Kulka. & Hough, 1994;
Orr , Claiborn, Altman, Forgue. De Jong, Pitman , &. Hen , 1990; Shalev et al. , 1996).
Relationships between dissociationandanxietyhavealsobeen found(Cardena & Spiegel,
1993).
The relevanceof dissociatioo to anxiety in PTSDcomesfromstudieslhal showmany
individuals with epilepsywho also suffer from anxiety experience auras mat resemble
aspects of dissociation prior 10their seizures. These auras may indicate acliYation of
limbic structures associated with fear anxiety (Adamcc, 1990). Auras such as time
changes, and derealization, have been found to distinguish epileptics with anxiety and
depression from epileptics withcut thesepsychopathologies(Stark-Adamec& Adamec.
1986; Adamecet al., 1990). Timechanges an1derealization havealso been reported in
phob ic anxiety patients without epilepsy (Huper de. Roth, 1962). Mart , Elwi n. and
Sweet (1m) report that a feeling of strangeness or unrealitycan beproducedby limbic
stimulation. Time change hasbeen found 10cluster with derealization (Adamec er al .
1990).
Time change and a senseof unreality are two aspectsof dissociation experienced at
the time of the trauma by ind:viduals who develop PTSD (Marmar et aJ., 1994). Thus,
it is possible thai these two types of dissociation may ind .ale limbic activation at the
time of traumain individuals who develop PTSD. As previouslydiscussed, Adamec and
Morgan (1994) have found that kindling of the right hemisphere amygdala increases
anxiety in rodents. It is possible that a kindling-like activation of the amygdala occurs in
".
individuals who develop PTSD in response to trauma which may produce the Inc-eases
in anxiety associated with PTSO. Indeed, it has been shown that individuals given
procaine hydrochlorideintravenousJy. exhibit, via positron emission tomography(PET),
increased glucose uptake in the amygdala (Parekh. Spencer, George, Gill, Kelter.
Andreason, Herscovitch, & Post, 1995). Procaine hydrochloride has been shown 10
increase fear and feelings of dysphoria in some individuals (Kellner, Post, Putnam,
Cowdry, Gardner, Kling, Minichiello, Trettau, & Coppola, 1987; Stark-Adamec,
Adamec, Graham, Bruun-Meyer, Perrin, Pollock, & Livingston, 1982). Ketter,
Andreason, George, Lee, Gill, Parekh, Willis,Herscovitch, and Post (1996) have found
that individuals who experience intense procaine-induced fear exhibit greater increases
in amygdalar cerebral blood flow after intravenous procaine injection than individuals
who do not exhibit procaine-induced fear. Moreover, Rausch et at (1995) have also
found that in comparison 10 a neutral state, in1ividuals with PTSD show an increased
blood flow, as measured by PET, in right-sided limbic and paraJimbic areas when
exposed to audiotapes of individualized traumatic event scripts. These findings suggest
tha t the amygdala maybe involved in the genesis of anxiety and other negative emotions
in humans. More importantly, excessive activation of the right amygdala is associated
with PTSD. It is possible that some form of temporolimbic sensitization, as suggested
by van der Kolk ( 1984)and Adamec(1990; 1996), occurs following traumatic stress and
appears neurally as excessive righl amygdala activation and behaviorally as increased
anxiety.
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If the increases in anxiety observed in PTSO art a result of traama-retated changes
to the amygdala it is unclear wheuer these alterationsproduce increases in trait anxiety
or stale anxiety. If the trauma alters the basal level functioning of the amygdala this
might indicate an increase in trait anxiety. However, if the nature:of the trauma is 10
hypersensitize lhe amygdala 10 subsequent input, it might suggest an increase in Slale
anxiety only. Rausch et al.· s (1995) PET study suggests that the latter may be the case.
However, much more research in this area is required before any definitve conclusions
can be reached.
The issue of dissociation as a possible marker of limbic activation in PTSD is one
that deserves investigation. If sucha relationship does exist. self-reportsof dissociation
may bea simple, Inexpensive meansof determining which individuals ate mostlikely 10
develop PTSD as a result of exposure to trauma.
The Relationship or Slate Anxiety to Startl e in PTSD
The results of the three models that examined the relationship between state anxicly
and startle in PTSD suggest that the increasedstartle respor.scs seen in individuals with
PTSD are the result of elevated levels of state anxiety. In each of lhethree models, the
path {rom state anxiety to startle. as measured by EMG response, was significant. The
only differences in the three models was the way in which this increase in stale anxiety
was produced, which was discussed above.
OU f findings suggest that the increased startle seen in veterans with PTSD may be
a form of fear-potentiated startle. The results of the present study are consistent witn
12'
previous researchby Morganet al. (1995)whofound an increasedrear-potentiated startle
in their sample of veteranswith PTSD, but 00 increase in baselinestartle.
In animals, it has been shown that low-level electrical stimulationof the amygdala
increases the amplitude of the startle-response (Rosen & Davis. 1990). Campeauand
Davis (1995) have suggested that the basolateral complex of the amygdala serves as a
necessary relay of sensory information from the cortical and subcorticalsensoryareas
to the central nucleusof theamygdala which they believe to bea responseindependent,
final common relay for fear conditioning. Rauschet aI. 's (1995) findingof increased
blood flowin the right amygdalaof individuals with PTSD whenexposedto audiotapes
of individual trauma events suggests that, in humans, activationof the amygdalaby fear
serves to potentiatestartle. It is interesting that Rauschet el . (1995) findincreasedblood
flow in the right amygdala, as this is in the hemisphere believed to be involved with
negative emotions(Sack1leim et al., 1932). In keepingwith thisidea, Vranaet al. (1988)
have found that, in normal individuals,the startle response is potentiated in responseto
negative but not positive visual images. Vrana et al. (1988) suggest that the startle
response may be a new meansof measuringemotionand assessing pathologicalanxiety.
Implleatlons or the Present Findings For Therapeutic Interve ntion in PISD
In all of the models we tested, the path from trait anxiety to hostility is significant.
This would suggest that one possible way of reducing hostility in veteranswith PTSD
might be to reduce anxiety. Indeed, it has been shown that PTSD patients treatedwith
anxiolydc medicationssuch as propanolol, a beta-blocker, do experiencea reduction in
12'
hostility/aggression (Kolb . Burris. &.Griffiths . 1984; Silver, Sand berg, &.Hates. 1990).
HO....ever, it may also be equally efficacious to use cogn itvc m ining to reduce
hostility. Reilly, Clark:, Shopshir-e, lewis, &: Sorensen (1994) have found thai PTSD
patients who undergoa cognitive-behavioral anger management program are able to
control their anger more ef fectively. Teaching individualswith PTSD moreappropriate
means of dealing wilhtheir feelings of anxiety shouldalso help to alleviatehostility.
An important issue that arises fromthe present study is the best way inwhich 10deal
with the increased levels of anxiety experienced by individuals with PTSD. Ir. as
Alternate Model 2a suggests, increasesin staleanxiety produce later increasesin trait
anxiety then it would be expected that early intervention therapies directed at reducing
Slate anxiety might be effective in preventing lilt development of the anxiety based
symptoms of PTSD entirely. In fact, researchers have suggested that early intervention
might prevent PTS D or Its chronic course(Davis& arestau, 1994; Friedman et at .
1994). Animal studiesindicate that this maybethecase. Adamec (1996) has found that
administering eeK.blockers to rodents after they have been exposed to a stressor
prevents lasting increases in anxiely like behaviors.
Early interventionstudieshave been conducted with indivdualsexposed10trauma.
It should be noted that Davis and Breslau(1994) state thai none of the studies 10 date
have been randomizedor controlled. However, Van der Kolk (1988) stalesthat acute
post-traumatic anxiety in adults is amenable to verbal therapies and suggests that
pharmacological intervention canhelp todecreasephysiologicalarousal which facilitates
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the individual's ability 10 retrieve traumatic memories. Blake (1986) describes three
patients with acute PTSD asa resultof an accident whorespondedfavorablyto treatment
with tricyclic antidepressants. Blake (1986)suggests thattricyclics, suchas imipramine,
may beeffective in diminishing or even preventing delayed symptoms inindividuals with
acute PTSD. These findings are consistent with the path fro m trauma 10 state anxietyin
Alternate Model 2a in that theysuggest reducing anxietyin individuals with acutePTSD
can prevent the developmentof the more chronic symptoms of PTSD.
Alternate Model2b suggests that treatingstate anxiety will not reduce trait anxiety.
If the increased levels of trait anxiety are a delayed symptom of PTSD, then early
interventions designed to treatanxiety in general maynot neccessartly be effectivein
reducing trait anxiety. This model suggeststhatindividualsshould be treated for elevated
stateanxietylevelsimmediately following traumatic exposure andalso beprovidedsome
form of therapeutic support, whether pharamcological or psychological, in order to
prevent or reduce later increases in levelsof trait anxiety.
One form of therapy that may reduce trait anxiety in sufferers of P'TSD is eye
movement desensitization (EMD). EMD is a techniquedevelopedby Shapiro (1989) in
which the patient is asked to visualize the traumatic event whilesimultaneously tracking
the therapist's finger as it moves quickly backand forthacross the patient's visualfield.
A number of studieshave reported theeffectiveness of EMD in treating the symptoms
of PTSD (Forbes, Creamer, & Rycroft, 1994; Kleinknecht & Morgan, 1992; Vaughn,
Armstrong, Gold, O'Connor,Jenneke, & Tarrier, 1994:Silver, Brooks, & Obenchain,
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1995; Vaughn, Wiese, Gold , & Tarrier, 1994) . Kleinknecht and Morgan (1992) report
the case o f a 40- year old man whoha d develo ped PTSD after being shot and left 10die.
Wh en the subject was initial ly assessed eight years after tile shooting, h is trail anx iety
score on the STAIcorresponded with the 64th percentile of psyc hiatric patients. Four
month s after being treated with EMD, his trait anxiety score was at the 26th percentile
for psychiatri c patients and a t eight months posttreatme nt his trai t anxiety score was al
th e 36th perce ntile for psychiatri c patie nts. While these results suggest that EMD may
hel p alleviate increased trai t anxiety in PTSD, this st udy, like many other studies
re porting the benefi ts of EMD, is based on o ne subjec t. Indeed . Herbe rt and M ucser
( 1992) have recommended th at statements regard ing the e fficacy of EMD should not be
made until the resul ts of more method ologicall y sound studies are availab le.
Eppley , Abrams, and Shear (1989 ) have co nducted a meta-analysis of the effec ts of
various relax ation techniques on trait anxie ty in non·PTS D populations and conclude that,
even after controlling for possible confound ing variab les, tra n scendental meditation
p rodu cts a significan tly large r reduction in trait anxiety than other forms of relaxa tion
suc h as progressive relaxation , EMG feedback, and e ther mcdlution recbnlquc s. Whethe r
transcendental meditat ion wou ld De e ffective in reducing the elevated levels of trait
anxiety that occur in PTSD rem ains to be dete rmined.
With re spect to the startle models of PTSD , the results imply that increased startle
rea ctions in individual s could be reduced by strategies designed to reduce state anxiety .
In fact. it has been shown in animal s tudies that anxiolytic drugs block fear -potentiated
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start le (Davis, Falls, Campeau, & Kim, 1993). While it has been shown that anxiogenics
such as yohimbine increase startle in normal humans (Morgan et aI., 1993) and
individuals with PTSD (Morgan etel. , 1995), it still remains to be determinedwhether
anxiolytlccompounds have the potential to reduce startle in humans. The results of the
present study suggest thai they would.
In summary. our models do imply different approache s for the treatment of anxiety,
hosti lity, guilt, and startle in PTSD. An extensive examinationof possible treatments for
PTSD is not the intention of the present study. However , it is hoped that our models
suggest rationales for different approaches to the treatment of PTSD.
Umilations of the Present Stud y
A common problem in many studies ofPTSD is small sample sizes. In the present
study , our sample sizes are fair ly smal l for the type of analyses we undertook. BenUer
(1985) suggests that 5 subjects per parameteris a minimum requirement for path analytic
studies. Based on this our first sample is adequate, but it does su ggest that the results
based on Sample 2 may be questionable.
Given that all of our models fit the data equally well and each has different
implications with regards to the treatment of PTSD it is essential that they be tested in
other , larger samples of veterans. This will allow researchers to reach more definitve
conclusions about the natureof anxiety, hostility. guilt, and startle in Vietnamveterans
with PTSD.
A second limitation is that our samples consisted solely of male subjects with
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combat- related PTSO. It hu been suggested that PTSD is not a homogencnous disorder
(K olb. 1989~ Ciccone, Bunl ein, and Greenste in, 1989). Ciccone et at. (1989) state that
it may not be feasible to construc t generalizations about PTSD based on o nly one
treatment group. Thus, it it would certainly be of empirical interest to determine wbich.
jf any. of our models replicate in othe rpopulal ions of PTS'J patientssuc h as female rape
v ictims o r sexualy and/or physical ly abused children.
Final ly, itshould bepointedout thai, as is the case with any correla tional study, our
results can notbe taken to imply ca usation. As Biddle and Martin (198 7) suggest, the
s trong...st conclusion thai can bereac hed when assessing a model is that one has correctly
predicted the patterning of observed, associationalrelationships. Thus, the models inthe
p resent study suggest causal relatio nships am ong anxiety, hostility, gu ilt, and s tartle in
PTSD. In additio n our models only include a small sample of the many sy mptoms
experienced by individuals wiUlPTSD . A valid exercise for future resea rchers mightbe
to construct path models that include other symptoms of PTSDsuch as depression, and
symptoms from the DSM-I V (1994) avoidance category.
S ummary
In the present study we we re able to produce several mode ls that suggcst
re lationships betweenanxiety, hostility , guilt , andstartle inPTSD. Given that the models
fi t the data fromour samples equally welland areall supported by the rel evant literature,
it remains unclear at this point which of these models best represents the relationships
among the se variables. It is possible thatthe different models may be more app licable
13.
10 dif ferent stages of the disorder . Alternate Models 2a and 3a, which suggest that
trauma increases state anxiety which then increases trait anxiety, may bemore applicable
10 the early stages of PTSD. Models 2 and 3 may be more applicable to individuals
who have suffered (rom the disorder for several years. Alternate Model 2b differs (rom
lhese models in that it suggests that state and trail anxiety are both affected by trauma
and that neither one impingesupon the other.
While we are unable 10 make any conclusive statements about a unique best lilting
model, the results of the present study suggest testable hypotheses about the etiology of
anxiety , hostil ity, guilt, and start le symptoms in PTSD. Moreover, the models suggest
different paths of treatment.
13.
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Appendix A
Stale-Trait Anxiety Inventory(STAi)
Fonn Y·I
DIRECTIONS: A number of statementswhichpeople have used to describe
themselvesare givenbelow. Readeachstatement and thenblackenin theappropriate
circle to tile right of the statement to indica te how you feel ri&htnow, that is , al lhis
moment . Thereareno rightor wronganswers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement but give the answer whichseemsto describeyour present feelings best.
Not at all
I . I fee l calm .
2. I feel secure .
3. lam tense .
4. J feel strained.•....... .. ..•...... ..•.•....
S. I feel at ease ..
6. I feel upset. .
7. I am presently worrying over possible
misfortunes............................... 1
8. I feel satisfied. I
9. I feel frightened.... ... .......... ......... I
10. I feel r.omfortable.. .. ......... .. ...... . 1
11. I feel self~nfideflt .. . . .. ... . .... .. .. .. I
12. I feel netVous...... ... ... .... .. ... .. .... I
13. I am jiuery.............................. t
14. I feel indecisive.... .. ... ..... .. .. .. .... 1
IS. I am relaxed........ .. .... .... ... . ...... I
16. I feel content........................... I
17. I am worried ........ .. ... ...... .... .... 1
18. I feel confused......................... J
19. J feel steady. .......... ... ........ .. .... 1
20. I feel pleasant...... .. .. ... .... .. .... ... 1
Moderately Somewhat
So
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
Very Much
So
4
4
4
4
4
4
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State-T rail Anxiety Inventory (STA!)
Form Y·2
DJRECOONS: A number of state ments w hich people have used to describe
themselves are given below. Read each sta tement and then bbcken in the appropria te
circle to lbe right of the st.alcmenl to indicate how youlen enU, feel . There ate no
right or wrong answers. Do not spend 100 much timeon any one statement but give
thean swer which seems 10 describe how you generally fed.
Not at all
21. 1 feel pleasant ..
22. I feel nervousandrestless .
23. 1 feel satisfied with myself.••...•..
24. I w ish I could beas happy as
others seem tobe .
25. I fee l like a failure .
26. I (ee l rested. ...•••. ••••••.•••••••.•.•••
1:1. I am calm, cool, and collected.••..
28. I fee l thai d ifficulties are piling up
so that I can not overcomethem •.••
29. I worry too much over something that
reall y doesn't matter .
30. I am happy .
31. I have disturbing thoughts.• •••••••.
32. I Jack self-<:onftdence ..
33. I feel secure .
34. I make decisions easily .
35. I fee l inadequate .
36. I am content.... ... . . . ••••.••.••. . .••.• I
37. Some unimportantthought runs lhrough
my mindand holhers me.... . . . ... .. I
38. I take disappointments so keenly that
r can 't put themout of my mind•••.•••
39. I am a steady person .
40. I gel in a stale of tension or turmoil
as J think over myrecent concerns
and interests .
Moderately Somewhat
So
2 3
2 3
2 3
V ery Much
So
4
4
4
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Appendix B
Buss-Durkee Inventory
Listed below are a number o f statements concerning pe rsonal atti tudes and traits.
Read each item and decide whether the stateme nt is TRUE or FAlSE as it pertain s 10
you personal ly. Cross 'T' for TRUE or 'F' for FALSE .
1. I seldom strike back, even if someone hits me first.
2. I sometimesspread gossip about people I don't like .
3. Unless somebody asks me in a nice way, I won't do
T
T
F
F
wbat they want.
4 . I lose my temper easily bUIget over it quickly.
S. 1 don', seem 10get what is coming to me.
6 . I know th at peop le tend to talk about me be hind my back.
7. When I di sapprove army friends' behavior , I lei the m know.
8. The few times I have cheated, I have suffe red unbea rable
feelings of remorse .
9. Oncein a while I cannotcomrol my urge to harm others.
10. I never get ma- ' ~ugh to throw things.
11. Sometimes people bolher mej ust by being around.
12. When somebody makes a ruleI don't like, t am
tempted to break it.
13. Other peop le always seem 10 get breaks.
14. I tend to beon my guardwilh people who are
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
T F
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somewhatmore friendly than r expected. T
IS. I often find myself disagreeing with people. T
16. I sometimes have bad thoughts which make me
feel ashamed of myself. T
17. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting anyone. T
18. When r am angry, I sometimessulk. T
19. When someo ne is bossy, I do the opposite of
what he asks.
20. I am irritated a great deal more than people are
awareof.
2 1. I don't know any people that I downright hate.
22. There area numberof people who seem to dislike
me very much.
23. I can't help getting into arguments when people
disagree with me.
24. People who shirk on the job must fed very guilty.
25 . If somebody hits me first, I lei him have lt.
26. WhenI am mad, I sometimes slamdoors.
27. I am alwayspatientwith others.
28. occasionally when I am mad at someone I will
give him the silent trea tment.
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
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29. When 1 look back on what' s happened10me, I can't
help feeling mildly resentful. T
30. There are a number of people who seemto be jealousof rne. T
31. I demand that people respect my rights. T
32. It depresses me that I did not do more for my parents. T
33. Whoever insults me or my family is asking for a fight. T
34. I never play practicaljokes. T
3S. It makes my blood boil to have somebody make fun of me. T
36. When people are bossy I take my time just to show them. T
37. Almost every week I see someone I dislike. T
38. I sometimes have the feeling that others are laughing at me. T
39. Even if my anger is aroused, I don't use strong language. T
40. I am concerned about being forgiven for my sins. T
41. People who continualy pester you are asking for a
punch in the nose. T
42. I sometimes pout when I don't get myown way. T
43. If somebody annoys me, I amapt 10 tell him what I think
of~m. T
44. I often feel like a powder keg ready 10 explode. T
45. Although I don't showit, I am sometimeseaten up
with jealousy. T
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46. My motto is never trust strangers. T
~7 . When people yell at me, I yell back, T
1:8. I do many things that make me feel remorseful afterward. T
49. WhenI really lose my temper, I am capable of
slappingsomeone. T
50. Since the age of len, I have never had a temper tantrum. T
51. When 1 get mad, I say nasty things. T
52. I sometimescarrya chip on my shoulder. T
53. tr I lei peoplesee the way I feel, I'd beconsidered
a hard person to get along with. T
54. I commonlywonder what hidden reasonanotherperson
may have for doing something nice for me. T
55. I could no! put someonein his place, even if he needed it. T
56. Failure gives me a feeling of remorse. T
57. I gel into fights about as often as the next person. T
58. I can remember being so angry that I pickedup
the nearest thing andbroke it. T
59. I often make threats I don't really mean 10 carry out. T
60. I can't help being a little rude to people I don't like. T
61. At times I feel I get a raw deal out of life. T
62. I used 10 think that most people told the truth but
169
now I know otherwise . T
63. I generally cover up my poor opinion of others. T
64. When I do wrong my conscience punishes me severely. T
65. If I have to resort to physical violence to defend
my rights, I will . • T
66. If someone doesn't treat me right. I don't let it annoy me. T
67. I have no enemies who really wish to harm me. T
68. When arguing, I tend to raise my voice. T
69. I often feel that I have lived the right kind of life. T
70. I haveknownpeoplewho pushedme so far thai we
came to blows. T
71. I don't let a lot of unimportantthings irritate me. T
72. I seldom feel that people are trying to anger or insult me. T
73. Lately I have been kindof grouchy. T
74. I would rather concede a point than get into an argument
.utit T
75. I sometimes show my anger by bangingon the table. T
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AppendixC
CombatExposure Scale
These questionsconcern the nature and extentof your exposure to combat if any,
including all experiences that look place on land, in the air, or at sea. There is a scale
ranging from0 to 3 or 0 to 4 undereachquestion.
Please choose theansweron thescaleunderneath eachquestionthatcomesclosest10
describing !Ql!..[ combat experiences,and circlethe number from 0 to 3 or 4 for that
choice. Ask the interviewerfor clarification of any questionyou may have.
I. How manytimesdid youever goon combatpatrols. participatein amphibious
invasions, or haveothervery dangerous duty.
o 1 2 3 4
None 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-50 times more than
50 time s
2. How manymonthswereyou ever under enemyfire.
o
Never
1
Lessthan
1 month
2
1-3
months
3
4 -6
months
4
more than
6 months
3. How manytimeswere you ever surrounded by theenemy.
o I 2 3
None 1-2 times 3-12 times more than
12 times
4. What percentageof the men in you unit werekilled (KJA), wounded, or missing
(MIA) in action.
o
No one
I
Between
1-25%
2
Between
26·50%
3
Mare than
50%
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S. How many times did you ever fire rounds al the enemy.
o I 2 3 4
None 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-50 times more lhan
sotimes
6. How many times did you ever see someonehit by incoming or outgoing rounds.
o I 2 3 4
None 1-2 times 3·12 rimes 13-SOtimes more than
50 limes
7. How many times were l'.2Y ever in danger or being injured or killed (i.e. , shot at,
bombed, torpedoed, pinned down. ambushed, near miss).
o I 2 3 4
None 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-50times more than
50 times
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Appendix D
Legacies Combat Scale-Revised
Now I would like to ask you some questions abou t the nature and extent of your
exposure to combat if any. including experiences that took place on land , in the air,
or at sea.
1. Were you part of an artillery unit which fired on the enemy _
2. Were you on a ship or aircraft that passes through hostile water s or air
space _
3. Were youstationed at a forwardobservation post or base camp(i.e. closeto
enemylines)•...•...••..•.. .•..••••... .•....•.• .. .••..•..•.. ..•••.•.•..•.....................•._
4. Did you receive friendly or hostile incoming fire from small ar ms, artill ery,
rockets, mortars,or bombs '''_
5. Did you enco unter mines or booby traps while on patrol or at your duty
statio n _
6. Did your unit receiv e sniper or sapper fire .. .. .. .
7. Was your unit ambushed or attacked ..
8. Did your unit engage the enemy in a firefight _
9. Did you sec either Ame ricans or other troops killed or wounded _
10 . Were you wounded or injured in comba t. .
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AppendixE
Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD
Circle the number that bestdescribes how you feel about each statement:
I. Although I do not have many close personalfriends now, before I entered the
military I had many friends.
1
Not at all
true
3
Somewhat
true
5
Very True
2. I have no guilt over things that I did in the military.
1
Not at all
true
3
Somewhat
true
5
Very True
3. If someone pushes me 100 far, I am likely to become violent.
1
Very
3
Somewhat
likely
5
Very likely
4. If something happens that reminds me of the military, I become very distressed and
upset.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
s. The people who know me best are afraid of me.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
6. I am able to gt t emotionally close to others.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
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7. I have nightmaresof experiences in the militarythai really happened.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
8 . When I think of some of the things I did in the military, I wish I were dead.
Never
9. It seems as if I have no feelings.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
5
Very Frequently
10. lately, I have felt like killing myself.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
I I . I faU asleep,stayasleepand awakenonlywhenthealarmgoes off.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Most of the time
12. I wonder why I am still alive when others died in the military.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
13. Beingin certain situationsmakes me feel as (houghI am back in the military.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
14. My dreamsat nightare so real that I wakenin a coldsweat and force myself to
stayawake.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
I7S
15. I feel like I cannot go on.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Mostofthc time
16. I do not laugh or cry at the same things other people do.
1
Not at al l
bu e
3
Somewhat
bue
5
True most or
the time
17. I still enjoy doing things that I used 10 enjoy.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Always
18. Daydreams are very real and frightening.
1
Never
3
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
19. I have found it easy to keep a job since my separation from the military .
1 3 5
Never Sometimes Very Frequently
20. I have trouble concentrating on tasks.
I 3 5
Never Sometimes Very Frequently
2 1. I have cried for no good reason.
1 3 5
Never Sometimes Very Frequently
22. I enjoy the compan y of others.
1 3 5
Never Sometimes Always
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23. I am frightel'1ed by my urges.
J
Sometimes
24. I rail asleep easily at night.
5
Very Frequently
I
Never
25. Unexpectednoises makeme jump.
1
Never
J
Sometimes
J
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
5
Very Frequently
26. No one, not even my family, understands how 1 feel.
1
Not at all
true
J
Somewhat
true
5
Completely
true
21. I aman easy-going, even-temperedperson.
I
Not at all
J
Somewhat
5
Very muchso
28. I feel there arecertain things that I did in the military thai I can never tell anyone
about becauseno one Vr'OUld ever understand.
1
Never
J
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
29. There have been times when I used alcohol (or other drugs) to help me sleepor to
make me forget about things thai happenedwhile I was in the military.
I
Never
J
Sometimes
5
Very Frequently
In
30. I feel comfortable when 1 am in a crowd.
I
Never
true
3
Sometimes
true
S
Always
'roe
31. J Jose mycool andexplodeover minoreveryday things.
I
Never
32. I am afraid to gOto sleep at night.
I
Nev"
3
Sometimes
3
Sometimes
S
Very Frequently
S
Most of the time
33. I try to stay away from anything that will remind me of things which happened
while I wasin the mililary.
I
Never
3
Sometimes
S
All the time
34. My memory is as good as it ever was,
I
Never
3
Sometimes
S
Most o f the lime
35. I have a hard timeexpressing my feelings even to the peopleI care about.
I
Not at aU
true
3
Sometimes
S
Most of the time
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Appendix F
Table I. Correlation matrix analyzed in Modell based on thedatafromSample I
(N=48).
COMBAT TRAIT STATE HI TOTAL HI GUILT
ANXIETY ANXIETY
COMBAT 1.000
TRAITA. .0.182 1.000
STATEA. .(l.158 0.869 1.000
HI TOTAL .(l.1.6 0.806 0:700 1.000
HI GUILT -0.104 0.57' 0.499 0.713 1.000
Table2. Correlation matrix analyzed for Model2 (modified model) basedon thedata
fromSample I (N =48).
PTSD Combat Trait State HlTotal HI Guilt PI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Comba t -0. 173 1.000
TraiI A. 0.895 .0.155 1.000
StateA . 0.n4 ..(). 134 0.864 1.000
HI Total 0.784 .(l.136 0.876 0.757 1.000
HI Guilt 0.588 -0.102 0.657 0.568 0.750 1.000
PI 1.000 .0.173 0.865 0.774 0.784 0.588 1.000
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Table 3. Correlation matrixanalyzed for Model 2 (modified model) based on the data
fromSample2 (N =25)
PTSD Combat Trail Stale HI T otal HI Guilt FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat 0.394 1.000
TraitA. 0.637 0.251 0.997
StateA. 0.385 0.151 0.602 1.000
HI Total 0.456 0. 180 0 .714 0.431 1.000
HI Guilt 0.317 0.125 0.496 0.299 0.695 1.000
Fl 1.000 0.394 0.637 0.385 0.456 0.317 1.000
Table 4. Correlation roam" analyzed for Alternate Model 2a based on thedata from
Sample 1 (N =48) .
PTSD Combat Trait Sla te HI Total HI Guilt FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat -0.176 1.000
TraitA . 0 .804 -0 .141 1.000
StateA. 0 .937 -ll. 165 0.858 1.000
HI Total 0.714 -ll.125 0.887 0.762 1.000
HI Guilt 0,549 -0.096 0.682 0.585 0.769 1.000
Fl 1.000 -0. 176 0.804 0.937 0.714 0.549 1.000
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Table 5. Correlation matrix analyzed for Alternate Model23 based on the data from
Sample 2 (N""'25)
PTSD Combat Trait State HI Tolal HI Guilt FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat 0 .406 1.000
Trait A. 0.523 0.2 12 1.000
Slate A. 0.700 0.284 0.746 1.000
HI Total 0.317 0. 129 0.606 0.45 3 1.000
HI Guilt 0.253 0.103 0.484 0.361 0.798 1.000
FI 1.000 0 ,406 0.523 0.700 0.317 0 .253 1.000
Table 6. Correlation matrix analyzed for AlternateModel 2b based on the data from
Sample 1 (N= 48) .
PTSD Combat Trait Slate HI Total HI Guilt FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Co mbat ·0. 168 1.000
TraitA. 0.902 ·0. 152 1.000
State A. 0.896 -0.15 1 0 .808 1.000
HI Total 0. 811 -0.137 0.899 0 .727 1.000
HI Guilt 0 .609 -0, 103 0. 675 0.546 0.751 1.000
FI 1.000 -0. 168 0.902 0.896 0.811 0.609 1.000
,.,
Table 7. Correlation matri.. analyzed for Alterna\e Model 2b based on the data from
Sample 2 (N =2S)
PTSD Combat Trail Staie HI Total HI GnH! FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat 0.321 1.000
Trait A. 0.620 0.199 1.000
SlateA . 0.620 0.199 0. 385 1.000
HI Total 0.496 0.159 0.799 0.308 1.000
HI Guilt 0.344 0.110 0.554 0.213 0.693 1.000
F I 1.000 0,321 0.620 0.620 0.496 0.344 1.000
Table 8. Correlationmatrix analyzed for Alternate Model 2c based on the data from
Sample I (N = 48) .
PTSD Combat Trait SOlie HI Total HI Guilt F I
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat -0.173 1.000
Trnit A. 0.924 --0.159 1.000
StalcA . 0.722 -o. I2S 0.892 1.000
HI Total 0.791 -0. 136 0.856 0.763 1.000
HI Guilt 0.593 -0.102 0.641 0.572 0.749 1.000
F I 1.000 -0.173 0.924 0.722 0891 0.593 1.000
,.2
Table9. Correlation matrixanalyzedforAlternate Model 2d basedon the data frem
Sample I (N =48).
PTSD Combat Trait State HI Total HI Guilt F I
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat -0.173 1.000
TraitA. 0.923 ·0.159 1.000
State A. 0.723 -0,125 0.891 1.000
HI Total 0.791 -0. 136 0.856 0.763 1.000
HIGuilt 0.593 ·0. 102 0.642 0.572 0.749 1.000
F I I.GJO ·0. 173 0.923 0.723 0.791 0.593 1.000
Table 10. Correlation matrixanalyzed for Model 3 based on the data from Sample 2
(N=25)
PTSD Combat Trait Stale HI Total EMG R.A FI
Anxiety Anxiety
PTSD 1.000
Combat 0.423 1.000
TraitA. 0.363 0,154 1.000
StateA. 0.283 0.120 0,778 1.000
HI Total 0.200 0.085 0.550 0,428 1,000
EMG R.A. 0.197 0.083 0.543 0.697 0.299 1.000
FI 1,000 0.423 0.363 0.283 0.200 0.197 1,000
re r
Table II. Correlation matrix analyzedfor AlternateModel3a basedon the datafrom
Sample 2 (N =2S)
PTSD Combat Trait Stale HI Total EMGR.A FI
Anxiety Anxiety
!"TSD 1.000
Combat 0.401 1.000
Traii A. 0 .28S 0. 116 1.000
Slate A. 0 .391 0.162 0.716 1.000
HI Total 0.163 0.066 0.572 0.410 I.COO
EMG R.A. 0.283 0. 116 0511 0.713 0.292 1.000
FI 1.000 0.407 0.285 0.397 0.163 0.283 1.000
Table 12. Correlation matrixanalyzed for Alternate Mcxlcl 3b basedon thedata from
Sample 2 (N.. 25)
P'TSD Combat Trait State HITota! EMG R.A F1
Anxiety Anxiety
P'TSD 1.000
Combat 0.264 1.000
TraitA. O.47S 0. 125 1.000
Slate A. 0.SS9 0. 147 0 .26S 1.000
HI To tal 0.333 0.088 0.702 0.186 1.000
EMG R.A . 0.509 0. 134 0 .242 0.911 0.170 1.000
F1 1.000 0.264 0,475 0559 0.333 0.509 1.000




